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A HIGHER AUTHORITY: CANADA’S CANNABIS 
LEGALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Antonia Eliason and Robert Howse*
Introduction
Recreational cannabis1 is being decriminalized, deregulated, and even 
legalized across a growing number of jurisdictions throughout the world.2
This article addresses the international law and policy implications of this 
trend, examining three international law frameworks: (1) the drug control 
and anti-trafficking framework of the United Nations (the “UN”) drug con-
ventions; (2) international human rights law; and (3) the international eco-
nomic law regime, in which the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”) is 
central. As we shall explain, there is no consistency and dialogue between 
* Antonia Eliason is Assistant Professor at the University of Mississippi School of 
Law. Robert Howse is Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International Law at NYU Law School. 
The authors are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from the participants at the 
Rethinking Trade and Investment Law conference on an early version of this research, as well 
as for the insights of, among others, Chantal Thomas, Greg Schaffer, Rob Wai, Kerry Rittich, 
David Kennedy, and Judge Dennis Davis. They would also like to thank their excellent re-
search assistants, particularly James Kelly at the University of Mississippi and Arpit Guru, 
LLM (NYU).  Simon Lester read a very early version of the manuscript and offered pointed 
and helpful criticism, as well as enthusiasm for the project. Howse presented a related paper at 
the NYU Law School summer faculty workshop and received useful comments and criticism 
from, among others, Kevin Davis, Rick Pildes, and Dick Stewart.
1. Recreational cannabis is physically identical to medical cannabis, however medical 
cannabis has been legalized in a number of countries and U.S. states and is available by pre-
scription in those jurisdictions to people suffering from certain medical conditions. Canna-
binoids are chemicals found in cannabis, with tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) being the main 
ingredient that results in the “high” feeling from consuming both recreational and medical 
cannabis. For medical purposes, cannabidiol or CBD is also of particular interest in reducing 
pain and inflammation since it does not result in intoxication. Medical cannabis tends to have 
higher levels of CBD and lower levels of THC than recreational cannabis. What Is the Differ-
ence Between Medical and Recreational Marijuana?, DOCMJ (June 5, 2017), 
https://docmj.com/2017/06/05/difference-medical-recreational-marijuana/.
2. Throughout this paper we have opted to use the term ‘cannabis’ rather than the 
more colloquial term ‘marijuana’ as cannabis encompasses a broader range of products and is 
more scientifically accurate. See About cannabis, GOV’T OF CANADA (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-medication/cannabis/about.html; Sean 
Williams, These 30 Countries Have Legalized Medical Marijuana in Some Capacity, THE 
MOTLEY FOOL (July 21, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/07/21/these-30-
countries-have-legalized-medical-marijuan.aspx; German Lopez, Marijuana is legal for medi-
cal purposes in 32 states, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/8/20/17938366/medical-marijuana-legalization-states-
map.
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these three regimes, and each has a distinctive impact on the legality of can-
nabis legalization.
On October 16, 2018, Canada legalized recreational cannabis.3 Cana-
da’s move represents an important event because of its stature in the interna-
tional community. Canada is a significant economic power, a member of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) 
and G7, and a state that has a major commitment to the international legal 
order. In this Article, we use Canada’s legal regime for cannabis liberaliza-
tion as a case study that illuminates the tensions and the unexplored com-
plementarities between the different international legal regimes or orders 
that affect cannabis legalization.
Mounting scientific evidence shows that cannabis, when responsibly 
used, is less harmful than other legal substances such as tobacco and alco-
hol.4 In addition to raising complex domestic legal and regulatory questions, 
legalization also raises issues of international law, which have been less 
prominently discussed or explored either in policy debate or in academic 
literature. First and most obvious is the United Nations international legal 
and regulatory framework for drug control and anti-trafficking, which en-
compasses the International Drug Control Conventions as well as activities 
of the World Health Organization (the “WHO”).5 This framework is gener-
ally viewed as highly unfavorable to the legalization of recreational drugs, 
including cannabis.6
Another international legal regime that is increasingly implicated is in-
ternational human rights law. At the domestic level, courts frequently in-
voke domestic constitutional norms of human rights to strike down laws that 
3. Dan Bilefsky, Legalizing Recreation Marijuana, Canada Begins a National Exper-
iment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/canada/
marijuana-pot-cannabis-legalization.html.
4. See Philip M. Boffey, What Science Says About Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/opinion/what-science-says-about-marijuana.
html.
5. The International Drug Control Conventions consist of three major treaties. Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 151, as amend-
ed by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 24, 1972, 
26 U.S.T. 1439, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Single Convention]; Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1971 Convention]; 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs in Psychotropic Sub-
stances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter 1988 Convention].
6. See, e.g., Damon Barrett, The Int’l Harm Reduction Ass’n, ‘Unique in International 
Relations’?: A Comparison of the International Narcotics Control Board and the UN Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, 8–9, (2008) (criticizing the International Narcotics Control Board 
(“INCB”), its secrecy, and its role as an obstacle to drug treatment and HIV prevention pro-
grams); Roojin Habibi & Steven J. Hoffman, Legalizing Cannabis Violates the UN Drug Con-
trol Treaties, but Progressive Countries like Canada Have Options, 49 OTTAWA L. REV., 427, 
432 (2017) (highlighting criticisms of the regime as “the product of a bygone era and out of 
step with contemporary norms and public health research.”).
Winter 2019] A Higher Authority 329
criminalize cannabis use.7 In addition to personal liberty and privacy, hu-
man rights are invoked in connection to the violence and inequitable use of 
the criminal justice system often associated with the war on drugs. Interna-
tional norms—for example, in the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (the “ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (the “ICESCR”)—often parallel and reinforce 
domestic constitutional rights.
Finally, and least discussed in existing literature, is the framework of 
international economic law as exemplified by the WTO. As the Appellate 
Body of the WTO emphasized in a recent case concerning Colombia, “illicit 
trade” is not exempt from WTO disciplines.8 Overall, the WTO legal 
framework permits member countries to ban trade in products that are also 
prohibited domestically. Where a country that is a WTO Member legalizes 
cannabis domestically, however, its justifications for restricting internation-
al transactions may well be closely scrutinized under WTO law, whether on 
the basis of protection of health or public morals. Such measures may in-
clude restrictions on advertising and packaging, the subject of a recent high-
profile WTO dispute concerning tobacco.9
It is difficult to explore in depth the three legal frameworks and their in-
teraction with respect to recreational cannabis legalization without suppos-
ing a concrete model for legalization, which may be one reason that interna-
tional legal scholarship is scarce or highly speculative. Canada’s federal 
government and provinces have, however, adopted a comprehensive legal 
and regulatory scheme in recent months for the distribution, sale, and use of 
recreational cannabis.10 This Article uses the Canadian regime as an oppor-
tunity to systematically explore the international legal challenges of canna-
bis liberalization.
The first country to legalize recreational cannabis on a national level 
was Uruguay in 2013.11 While a growing number of countries have legal-
7. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court 
of Justice], 25/8/2009, “Arriola, Sebastián y otros / Recurso de Hecho”, Fallos de la Corte 
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Fallos] (2009-332-1965) (Arg.). We are grateful to Ruti 
Teitel for informal translations of the Spanish text of this judgment. See also Minister of Jus-
tice and Constitutional Development v. Prince, [2018] ZACC 30 (CC) at 55, ¶ 100 (S. Afr.).
8. Appellate Body Report, Colombia—Measures Relating to the Importation of Tex-
tiles, Apparel and Footwear, ¶¶ 5.41–45, WTO Doc. WT/DS461/AB/R (adopted June 22, 
2016).
9. See Panel Report, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geo-
graphical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Prod-
ucts and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, WT/DS467/R 
[hereinafter Australia–Plain Packaging].
10. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 7 (Can.); Cannabis Regulations, SOR/2018-144
(Can.). 
11. GOVERNMENT OF CAN., A FRAMEWORK FOR THE LEGALIZATION AND 
REGULATION OF CANNABIS IN CANADA: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
CANNABIS LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION 10 (2016) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
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ized and regulated medical cannabis,12 the Canadian Cannabis Act is the 
most ambitious liberalization effort yet of any state with a large presence in 
the international community and global economy.13 Countries recognized 
that Canada’s move represented a significant shift in how countries would 
view cannabis use. Even before the Canadian regime was implemented, 
Russia argued that Canada’s legalization violated international law and 
threatened to bring a complaint before the United Nations.14 In this Article, 
we examine the Canadian law and its supporting regulations in light of the 
United Nations drug control and anti-trafficking framework; the internation-
al human rights regime; and the international economic law regime. We 
draw conclusions as to the kind of domestic legal and regulatory approaches 
that are most likely to create tensions with international law, on the one 
hand, or exploit complementarities with international law, on the other 
hand. We also pose questions as to the necessity of better integrating or ad-
dressing tensions between these three international legal frameworks in or-
der for international law to guide the phenomenon of recreational cannabis 
legalization in a coherent way for the good of the international community.
Part I of this Article provides and overview of some of the key terms 
and provisions of Canada’s Cannabis Act. Part II looks at the Cannabis Act 
in the context of the International Drug Conventions, examining how the 
various convention provisions might apply, looking first at the Single Con-
vention and then at the 1988 Convention and how that convention fits with 
Canadian constitutional provisions. Part III focuses on the international hu-
man rights framework and how the Cannabis Act might be viewed as com-
patible with international human rights law even where incompatible with 
the International Drug Conventions. This Part also offers a look at some of 
the cannabis-related human rights jurisprudence that arose in various juris-
dictions. Finally, Part IV analyzes the Cannabis Act in light of the interna-
tional economic law framework, providing an in-depth overview of how 
various WTO provisions might affect the Cannabis Act as drafted.
12. Amanda Erickson, Mexico Just Legalized Medical Marijuana, WASH. POST (June 
21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/06/21/mexico-just-
legalized-medical-marijuana/?utm_term=.acee545488d2; Jon Sharman, Poland Legalises 
Medical Cannabis, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 4, 2017, 5:39 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/poland-legalise-medical-marijuana-cannabis-pharmacy-a8037681.html.
13. See generally, Rob Crilly, Canada Is First Major Economy to Vote to Legalise Rec-
reational Cannabis Use, TELEGRAPH (June 20, 2018, 9:33 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2018/06/20/canada-votes-legalise-recreational-cannabis-use/; Chelsea Cox, The Cana-
dian Cannabis Act Legalizes and Regulates Recreational Cannabis Use in 2018, 122 HEALTH 
POL’Y 205 (2018). 
14. Jason Lemon, Russia Says Canada Weed Legalization is a ‘Breach’ of Internation-
al Legal Obligations, NEWSWEEK, (June 25, 2018, 3:31 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/
russia-condemns-canada-decision-legalize-weed-994690.
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I.  Canada’s Cannabis Act
In 2001, Canada decriminalized medical cannabis.15 In April 2017, 
Canada released a first draft of its proposed regulation expanding the legali-
zation of cannabis to cover recreational as well as medical purposes.16 The 
law was passed on June 21, 2018, incorporating several proposed amend-
ments, and came into effect on October 17, 2018. Bill C-45, also known as 
the Cannabis Act (the “Act”), authorizes the Canadian government to enact 
further regulations in addition to amending the Controlled Drugs and Sub-
stances Act and several other related acts.17 The Act delegates authority over 
several important matters to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of 
Canada (the “Minister”) to address through regulation.
Key terms in the Act include “produce,” which is defined in relation to 
cannabis as “to obtain it [cannabis] by any method or process.”18 Such 
methods include manufacturing, synthesis, chemical or physical alteration, 
cultivating, propagating, or harvesting it or any living thing from which it 
can be extracted or otherwise obtained.19 One of the main goals the Act sets 
out is to provide “for the licit production of cannabis to reduce illicit activi-
ties in relation to cannabis . . . .”20 Other goals include protecting public 
health and safety.21 Additionally, the Act is meant to “deter illicit activities 
in relation to cannabis through appropriate sanctions and enforcement 
measures” as well as to “provide access to a quality-controlled supply of 
cannabis . . . .”22 These objectives speak directly to cannabis as a good and 
implicate international trade law in the conceptual framework of the Act.
The Act further prohibits possession of cannabis for purposes of selling 
it where not authorized under the act23 as well as prohibiting the sale of can-
nabis or anything held out to be cannabis to any individual, whether over or 
under 18 years of age, or to any organization if not authorized to sell canna-
bis under the Act.24 This would seemingly criminalize the sale of oregano 
being passed off as cannabis by unauthorized cannabis dealers. The Act also 
abstains from fully regulating cannabis distribution and sale implicitly be-
cause aspects of these activities fall within provincial jurisdiction under the 
15. Mohammad Hajizadeh, Legalizing and Regulating Marijuana in Canada: Review 
of Potential Economic, Social, and Health Impacts, 5 INT’L J. HEALTH POL’Y & MGMT. 453, 
453 (2016).
16. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 7 (Can.).
17. Id. § 139(1).
18. Id. § 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 7(c).
21. Id. § 7.
22. Id. § 7(d), (f).
23. Id. § 10(1).
24. Id. § 10(2). 
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Constitution Act of 1867. Moreover, the Act continues to approach cannabis 
regulation as primarily a criminal law matter.25
The Act directly addresses the import and export of cannabis, stating 
simply that, “[u]nless authorized under this Act, the importation or exporta-
tion of cannabis is prohibited.”26 Possession for purposes of exportation is 
similarly prohibited.27 The Act does not provide more detail, leaving the 
specifics of importation/exportation to further legislative measures author-
ized under the Act.
The Act limits home cultivation to four plants in a home at any given 
time, irrespective of the number of residents in the home.28 Critics of the Act 
suggest that this would potentially expose minors to cannabis, which would 
run contrary to several of the stated objectives of the Act—to protect young 
persons from inducement to use cannabis as well as protecting the health of 
young persons by restricting their access to cannabis.29
The Act further limits advertisement, stating that, unless authorized un-
der the Act, promotion of cannabis, cannabis accessories, or services related 
to cannabis is prohibited, including the communication of information con-
cerning price or distribution,30 unless the promotion is directly addressed to 
an individual over 18 years of age.31 This appears to contrast with U.S. do-
mestic regulations concerning promotion of cannabis, where, despite recrea-
tional cannabis only being legal in a few states, periodicals such as Canna-
bis Now explicitly advertise a variety of cannabis products and accessories 
to purchasers of the magazine, even in states where cannabis is illegal. The 
Canadian prohibition extends to publications originating outside of Canada, 
which would include such American periodicals.32 Additionally, the Act 
prohibits individuals, events, activities, and facilities from sponsoring can-
nabis or cannabis accessory producers.33
The Act requires cannabis to be sold in accordance with the regulations 
on packaging and labeling; the key here is that the packaging cannot glam-
orize cannabis or associate it with any persons. The aim of this restriction is 
25. Jeremy de Beer & Alyssa Gaffen, Intellectual Property Rights in the Recreational 
Cannabis Market: Craft or Commodity, 50 U.B.C. L. REV. 621, 624 (2017).
26. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 11(1) (Can.).
27. Id. § 11(2). 
28. Id. § 12(4)–(5). (“Dwelling-house,” the term used for home in the Act, is defined 
according to the Criminal Code definition, as “the whole or any part of a building or structure 
that is kept or occupied as a permanent or temporary residence,” including mobile homes. Id.
§ 2; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 § 2 (Can.)). 
29. Ryan Maloney, Liberal Pot Bill Could See Kids Recruited as ‘Drug Mules’ by
Dealers, Tories Argue, HUFFINGTON POST CAN. (May 31, 2017), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/05/31/liberal-pot-bill-marilyn-gladu-rob-nicholson_n_
16896582.html; see also Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 7(a)–(b) (Can.). 
30. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 17(1)(a) (Can.).
31. Id. § 17(2)(a).
32. Id. § 20.
33. Id. § 21.
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in part to reduce inducements for youth to use cannabis.34 Similarly, canna-
bis accessories cannot be labeled or packaged in ways that would make 
them appealing to young persons or that would glamorize the use of canna-
bis.35 The Act additionally forbids provision or offers to provide cannabis or 
cannabis accessories “without monetary consideration”36 or in exchange for 
services rather than money.37 The Act also prohibits the use of games, lotter-
ies, and raffles as an inducement for the purchase of cannabis or cannabis 
accessories.38
The Canadian government created the Task Force on Cannabis Legali-
zation and Regulation (the “Task Force”) to review key challenges relating 
to the legalization of recreational cannabis and to provide recommendations 
to the government in advance of its drafting of the Act.39 In its final report, 
after receiving input from various constituents with an interest in the poten-
tial legalization of recreational cannabis, the Task Force discussed possible 
options for structuring the market. With respect to wholesale distribution, 
the Task Force recommended regulation by the provinces and territories ra-
ther than by the federal government since the existing provincial alcohol 
distribution networks could be applied to the distribution of cannabis.40 For 
the retail market, the Task Force recommended that provinces and territories 
regulate such sales in collaboration with municipalities, seeing benefit in 
both the government-run model and the private-enterprise model.41 While 
some constituents felt that a government monopoly similar to that used by 
most provinces and territories in relation to alcohol sales was the best mod-
el, others advocated for private enterprise models more akin to the retail 
market in Colorado and other U.S. states that have legalized recreational 
cannabis.42 Both models, the Task Force found, could adequately serve cus-
tomers as long as there is no co-location of alcohol or tobacco and cannabis 
sales.43
The Cannabis Act proposes legalization through licensing and gives 
broad discretion to the Minister in charge of implementing the Act to estab-
lish a legal regime to grant licenses.44 In addition to the Cannabis Act, the 
Canadian government published the Cannabis Regulations, which came into 
effect on October 17, 2018. The regulations help initiate the Cannabis Act 
34. See id. § 26(a).
35. Id. § 27.
36. Id. § 24(1)(a).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 24(1)(b).
39. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.
40. Id. at 33.
41. Id. at 34–35.
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id. at 35.
44. See Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 61(1) (Can.).
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and detail what rules apply for the production, distribution, sale, importa-
tion, and exportation of cannabis, particularly with respect to licensing.45
The Canadian medical cannabis system already operated through a li-
censing regime prior to the enactment of the Cannabis Act. The Access to 
Cannabis for Medical Purposes Regulation, which governed medical canna-
bis in Canada until its repeal in 2018,46 was replaced by the broader Canna-
bis Regulations.47 These Regulations contemplate the import and export of 
medical cannabis and provide detailed procedures that licensed producers 
who import or export medical cannabis must follow to obtain import or ex-
port licenses.48 For an import permit, for instance, the licensed producer 
must provide information regarding, amongst other things, a description of 
the product, its intended use, its quantity, its Tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) 
content, the name and address of the exporter, the port of entry into Canada, 
the address of the customs office to which the product will be delivered, and 
the modes of transportation used, including whether or not there is trans-
shipment. 49 The Minister of Justice must then review the information and, if 
applicable, approve the permit.50 Under the Cannabis Act, import and export 
licenses for cannabis “may be issued only in respect of cannabis for medical 
or scientific purposes or in respect of industrial hemp.”51 In other words, 
there is to be no import/export of recreational cannabis.
II.  Canada’s Act in Light of the 
International Drug Conventions
There can be no discussion of the legalization of cannabis without a 
comprehensive account of the UN drug control and anti-trafficking frame-
work, which consists of three treaties and the various institutional arrange-
ments that implement them. The key UN drug treaties are the Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol (the 
“Single Convention” or “1961 Convention”), the 1971 Convention on Psy-
chotropic Substances (the “1971 Convention”), and the 1988 United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances (the “1988 Convention”).52 The International Narcotics Control 
45. See Cannabis Regulations, supra note 10.
46. Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes Regulation, SOR/2016-230 (Can.).
47. Cannabis Regulations, supra note 10.
48. See Cannabis Regulations, supra note 10, pt. 10.
49. Cannabis Regulations, supra note 10, §205. THC is the main psychoactive compo-
nent in cannabis and is responsible for the “high” that consumers of cannabis experience. See 
What Is the Difference Between Medical and Recreational Marijuana?, supra note 1.
50. Id. § 206.
51. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 62(2) (Can.).
52. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, The International Drug Control Conventions 
(2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_
Conventions/Ebook/The_International_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf. 
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Board (the “INCB”) and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs operate togeth-
er to enforce the drug treaties.53 The WHO offers technical expertise to the 
United Nations on the scheduling of substances under the drug conven-
tions,54 while the Commission on Narcotic Drugs takes decisions regarding 
scheduling.55
The 1988 Convention requires parties to criminalize the “cultivation of 
opium poppy, coca bush or cannabis plant for production of narcotic 
drugs.”56 It further “[r]equires countries to criminalize possession, purchase 
or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal con-
sumption” when those substances are prohibited by the Single Convention 
or the 1971 Convention.57 The Single Convention provides limited opportu-
nities to export cannabis, prohibiting states from knowingly permitting the 
export of drugs except as authorized by the country of destination and with-
in the limits specified to the INCB for scientific or medical research purpos-
es or as required for the manufacture of other drugs.58 It also requires the es-
tablishment of government agencies to control cannabis regulation.59 The 
main accomplishment of the 1988 Convention is that it extends controls to 
the entire market chain, from precursors at the beginning of the chain60 to 
anti-money laundering measures at the end of the chain.61
53. Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 5 (“The Parties, recognizing the competence 
of the United Nations with respect to the international control of drugs, agree to entrust to the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council, and to the International 
Narcotics Control Board, the functions respectively assigned to them under this Conven-
tion.”).
54. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.
55. The International Drug Control Conventions, supra note 52, at 1.
56. 1988 Convention, supra note 5, art 3, ¶ 1(a)(ii). 
57. Id. art. 3 ¶ 2.
58. See Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 31 (referring in part to art. 19, ¶ 2).
59. Id. art. 28.
60. See 1988 Convention, supra note 5, at pmbl. A precursor is a substance involved in 
a chemical reaction to produce one or more other substances. In the context of psychoactive 
substances for example, acetic anhydride is a substance that is essential in the refinement of 
morphine to heroin. See Heroin drug profile, EUR. MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS AND DRUG 
ADDICTION (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/drug-profiles/heroin.
61. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1(b)(i) (requiring parties to adopt measures establishing as criminal of-
fenses under domestic law acts including “[t]he conversion or transfer of property, knowing 
that such property is derived from any offence or offences established in accordance with sub-
paragraph (a) of this paragraph. . . .”); see also id. art. 3, ¶ 1(a)(i) (referring to offences relat-
ing to the “production, manufacture, extraction; preparation, offering, offering for sale, distri-
bution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, 
transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance con-
trary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 
Convention . . . .”)); id., at pmbl. (“Recognizing also the importance of strengthening and en-
hancing effective legal means for international co-operation in criminal matters for suppress-
ing the international criminal activities of illicit traffic.”).
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This Part will further analyze each of these treaties and their institutions 
in order to draw out the facets of Canada’s domestic legal and regulatory 
approaches most likely to create tension or exploit complementarities with 
international drug law. At the same time, this Part highlights some of the 
flaws that exist in the treaties, including issues with the classification of 
cannabis.
A. The Single Convention
Article 4(c) of the Single Convention reads: “The parties shall take such 
legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary . . . subject to 
the provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively to medical and scien-
tific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, 
trade in, use and possession of drugs.”62 Article 3(2) of the 1988 Convention 
reinforces this obligation:
Subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its 
legal system, each Party shall adopt such measures as may be nec-
essary to establish as a criminal offence under its domestic law, 
when committed intentionally, the possession, purchase or cultiva-
tion of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personal con-
sumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention.63
At the same time, Article 25 of the 1988 Convention states: “The provisions 
of this Convention shall not derogate from any rights enjoyed or obligations 
undertaken by parties to this Convention under the 1961 Convention[.]”64 In 
other words, to the extent that there any limits or flexibilities in the Single 
Convention with respect to the obligation to prevent production, sale, pos-
session, and use of cannabis for non-medical and non-scientific purposes, 
the “rights” would also apply to limit the obligations in Article 3(2) of the 
1988 Convention.
Additionally, the Single Convention contains a codified medical and 
scientific purposes exemption in the form of Article 2(5)(b) that states, in 
relation to Schedule IV drugs, that:
[a] Party shall, if in its opinion the prevailing conditions in its coun-
try render it the most appropriate means of protecting the public 
health and welfare, prohibit the production, manufacture, export 
and import of, trade in, possession or use of any such drug except 
for amounts which may be necessary for medical and scientific re-
search only, including clinical trials therewith to be conducted un-
der or subject to the direct supervision and control of the Party.65
62. Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 4(c).
63. 1988 Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, ¶ 2.
64. Id. art. 25.
65. Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 2, ¶ 5(b).
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The UN drug conventions improperly classify certain substances, in-
cluding cannabis, into schedules based on outdated information. Schedule 
IV drugs are a subset of Schedule I drugs and include cannabis and cannabis 
resin but not cannabis extracts and tinctures, which are included in Schedule
I.66 Schedule IV contains those drugs that are deemed most harmful and 
prone to abuse, including heroin and cocaine. These drugs are viewed as 
lacking therapeutic value.67 The classification system for the big three—
heroin, coca, and cannabis—relies on outdated scientific evidence; heroin’s 
status was last reviewed in 1949, and cannabis and the coca leaf were last 
reviewed in 1965.68 As is clear from the wealth of medical and scientific re-
search since then, cannabis has considerable medical benefit as well as lim-
ited potential for abuse.69 To further complicate matters, cannabis is sched-
uled under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, while THC, the 
psychoactive ingredient responsible for the “high” experienced by cannabis 
users, is scheduled under the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substanc-
es.70 The incorrect scheduling of cannabis based on outdated information 
further complicates efforts to move toward legalization of cannabis and 
suggests that this scheduling needs to be reviewed.
66. The Single Convention established the four schedule: Schedule I, which contains 
drugs that are liable to significant abuse but which have potential therapeutic uses; Schedule 
II, which includes drugs such as codeine that have lower abuse potential than Schedule I 
drugs; Schedule III, which lists exempt preparations of drugs in Schedules I and II; and 
Schedule IV, which contains Schedule I drugs that are particularly liable to abuse with no 
therapeutic offset. See Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 2, ¶ 5.
67. Id. art. 3, ¶¶ 3–5 (Article 3, ¶ 5 states that if the WHO finds that a Schedule I drug 
“is particularly liable to abuse and to produce ill effects . . . and that such liability is not offset 
by substantial therapeutic advantages not possessed by substances other than drugs in Sched-
ule IV,” the drug may be placed in Schedule IV.).
68. CHRISTOPHER HALLAM ET AL., SCHEDULING IN THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL SYSTEM 4 (2014), https://www.tni.org/files/download/dlr25_0.pdf. 
69. See, e.g., Hajizadeh, supra note 15, at 453 (noting that cannabis has been used me-
dicinally and recreationally for thousands of years, and that proponents of recreational legali-
zation highlight the lower danger of overdose and addiction with cannabis). This is not to say 
that cannabis has no potential for abuse – like alcohol, there are negative consequences of 
heavy cannabis use. As Jean-François Crépault has argued with respect to Canada’s cannabis 
legalization, this is potentially problematic in the context of public health and legalization of 
cannabis as “individuals are encouraged to consume. Our society requires, as all capitalist so-
cieties do, healthy, consuming bodies in order to function and flourish.” Jean-Francois 
Crépault, Cannabis Legalization in Canada: Reflections on Public Health and the Govern-
ance of Legal Psychoactive Substances, FRONTIERS IN PUB. HEALTH (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2018.00220/full. See also Dirk W. 
Lachenmeier & Jürgen Rehm, Comparative risk assessment of alcohol, tobacco, cannabis and 
other illicit drugs using the margin of exposure approach, 5 SCI. REP., no. 8126, Jan. 2015, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4311234/pdf/srep08126.pdf; Benedikt Fisher 
et al., Lower-Risk Cannabis Use Guidelines: A Comprehensive Update of Evidence and Rec-
ommendations, 107 AM. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH e1 (2017), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/
doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2017.303818; THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF CANNABIS AND
CANNABINOIDS (2017).
70. HALLAM ET AL., supra note 68, at 7.
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Recognizing that the classification of cannabis reflects outdated infor-
mation, the WHO recently recommended that whole-plant marijuana and 
cannabis resin be removed from Schedule IV in addition to moving THC 
and its isomers from the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances to 
Schedule I of the Single Convention.71 The proposal also recommends that 
CBD should not be scheduled within the drug conventions.72 The proposal 
will be presented to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which will 
then have to vote on it. Should the proposal pass, this will have a significant 
impact in demonstrating a global shift in attitude toward cannabis—though 
the legal impact will be limited as legalization of recreational cannabis 
would still be precluded under a strict interpretation of the treaties.
The INCB explicitly stated its view that Canada’s scheme for legalizing 
recreational cannabis is a violation of Article 4(c) of the Single Convention. 
According to the INCB,
[w]hile other provisions of the international drug control conven-
tions may lend themselves [to] flexible interpretation, leaving the 
modalities of implementation to the discretion of States, the obliga-
tion contained in Article 4 c) [sic] of the Single Convention . . . is 
absolute and unequivocal in nature. Article 4 (c) is a peremptory 
norm for which implementation is a sine qua non of compliance 
with the international legal drug control framework.73
Further, according to the INCB, Canada’s scheme is “also inconsistent with 
Canada’s obligations as a Party to the 1988 United Nations Convention Ar-
ticle 3(2), which requires parties to establish as a criminal offence the inten-
tional possession, purchase, or cultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances for personal consumption contrary to the provisions of the 1961 
Convention.”74
Despite its importance as an oversight body for the United Nations drug 
control and anti-trafficking framework, the INCB is not the final authority 
for interpreting the drug conventions. Both the Single Convention and the 
1988 Convention give that authority to the International Court of Justice 
(the “ICJ”).75 Since both Conventions are treaties within the meaning of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the “VCLT”), in interpreting the 
71. Tom Angell, World Health Organization Recommends Reclassifying Marijuana 
Under International Treaties, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
tomangell/2019/02/01/world-health-organization-recommends-rescheduling-marijuana-under-
international-treaties/#60030c3b6bcc. 
72. World Health Org. Director-General, Letter dated Jan. 24, 2019 from the World 
Health Org. to the Secretary-General.
73. Int’l Narcotics Control Bd., Brief on the Conformity of Bill C-45, An Act Respecting 
Cannabis and to Amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Criminal Code and 
Other Acts, as Passed by the House of Commons, November 27, 2017, ¶ 15, (Apr. 11, 2018).
74. Id. ¶ 17.
75. 1988 Convention, supra note 5, art. 32, ¶ 2; Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 
48, ¶ 2.
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rights and obligations of the Single and 1988 Conventions, the ICJ will un-
doubtedly apply the interpretive principles set out in Articles 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT.76 Article 31 underlines the importance of giving the ordinary 
meaning to words in the text of the treaty, and, as some international tribu-
nals have noted, it is important to give meaning to all the words that are pre-
sent in a particular treaty provision under consideration. A treaty interpreter 
is required to interpret a treaty in light of its purpose, object, and context.77
Thus, for example, one must evaluate the consistency of Canada’s scheme 
not only with Article 4(c) but together with its obligations to prevent drug 
abuse under Article 38. The language of 4(c) itself establishes a hierarchy or 
priority between the obligation to take measures to prevent non-medical and 
non-scientific uses and other provisions of the Convention. As noted, that 
obligation is “subject to” other provisions of the Convention. Canada may 
therefore modify or even derogate from its obligation under 4(c) to the ex-
tent that this is necessary to fulfill its obligation under Article 38 to “take all 
practicable measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs.”
Furthermore, according to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, the treaty in-
terpreter must apply any other relevant rules of international law that are 
binding between the parties. This may include human rights norms, the pro-
visions of WTO treaties, or the international law frameworks considered in 
the next sections of this Article. Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sets out 
the sources of international law, which include treaty, custom, general prin-
ciples, and, secondarily, decisions of international and domestic courts and 
tribunals and the views of distinguished authorities in public international 
law.78
76. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Article 31 General Rule of Interpretation: 1. A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. . . . 3. There shall 
be taken into account, together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) Any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the par-
ties regarding its interpretation; (c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties. . . . Article 32 Supplementary Means Of Interpretation: Re-
course may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting 
from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation accord-
ing to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which 
is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”).
77. Id. art. 31, ¶ 1.
78. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, opened for signature June 
26, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1153 (“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a) international conventions, 
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c) the general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations; d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judi-
cial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”).
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Despite the INCB’s assertion that the obligation in the Single Conven-
tion to prohibit non-medical and non-scientific use of cannabis is unequivo-
cal, a close reading of the Single Convention employing the principles of 
the VCLT suggests a much more complex picture.79 The exact wording of 
Article 4(c) of the Single Convention directs parties to take necessary legis-
lative and administrative measures to control and regulate drugs: “Subject to 
the provisions of this Convention, to limit exclusively to medical and scien-
tific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distribution of, 
trade in, use and possession of drugs.”80 The INCB largely relies on this text 
while ignoring the lead-in words “subject to the provisions of this Conven-
tion.” These words, however, are essential to understanding the scope and 
limits of the obligation that follows to take measures to prohibit non-
medical and non-scientific use of cannabis. The words “subject to the other 
provisions of this Convention” mean that, in fact, the prohibition is not une-
quivocal; to the contrary, it may be circumscribed by “other provisions.” 
The French version of the Single Convention underlines the limiting nature 
of this phrase through its rendering of this clause as “[s]ous réserve des dis-
positions de la présente Convention” (under reservation of the provisions of 
the present Convention).81
A first step in determining the consistency of Canada’s scheme for le-
galizing cannabis with the obligation in Article 4(c) would therefore be to 
consider other provisions of the Single Convention that might qualify or de-
limit the obligation to take measures to prohibit non-medical and non-
scientific use of cannabis. In our view, several provisions are relevant.
First, Article 28 (“Control of Cannabis”) of the Single Convention 
clearly envisages that, under some circumstances, a Party to the Convention 
may permit “the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of can-
nabis or cannabis resin.” Article 23, however, subjects cultivation to a “sys-
tem of controls” aimed at “respecting the control of the opium poppy.”82 Ar-
ticle 23 also provides that growing cannabis shall be exclusively under the 
control of a government agency, which will license growers, acquire pro-
duction, and retain the exclusive rights of importing, exporting, and whole-
sale trading.83 Canada’s scheme (admittedly) does not conform in exact de-
tail to the “system of controls” that Article 23 envisages.84 Allowing 
individuals to cultivate a small number of plants for their own use is the 
79. See Habibi & Hoffman, supra note 6.
80. Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 4(c).
81. Convention Unique sur les Stupèfiants de 1961, Telle que Modifiée par le Protocole 
de 1972 Portant Amendement de la Convention Unique sur les Stupéfiants de 1961 art. 4(c) 
August 8, 1975, 976 U.N.T.S. 105 (emphasis added).
82. Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 28, ¶ 1.
83. Id. art. 23, ¶¶ 1, 2(b), (e).
84. Article 23, ¶ 2(a) of the Single Convention requires, for instance, that the govern-
ment agency designate the areas in which and the plots of land on which cultivation can take 
place.
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most prominent example of where Canada’s scheme departs from a strict 
interpretation of Article 23’s “system of controls.”85 But, overall, from li-
censing and permit provisions to strict limitations on trade, Canada’s 
scheme constitutes a highly managed, government-controlled system for le-
gal recreational cannabis.
This system supports the object and purpose of the controls envisaged 
by Article 23, which is to prevent domestic production and trade in cannabis 
from creating negative externalities or spillover effects for other states. Such 
spillovers would occur if lax or non-existent domestic controls were to facil-
itate the entry of cannabis into the stream of illicit international com-
merce.86 As the preamble states, the premise of the Single Convention is the 
need for “co-ordinated and universal action” or “international co-operation,” 
that is, so that the policies of one country do not undermine the drug control 
policies of other countries. Hence, the Single Convention is really an elabo-
ration of the norms in earlier conventions which focused on international 
trade and trafficking of narcotics.87
The 1988 Convention refers to “illicit trafficking” in its title. The Single 
Convention’s aim to limit “such drugs to medical and scientific use” implies 
the same goal of preventing illicit trafficking. But it would be erroneous to 
interpret the Single Convention as requiring state parties to altogether pro-
hibit non-medical and non-scientific use of the identified drugs under do-
mestic law. Rather, the Single Convention stipulates that states cooperate 
with each other to ensure that any elements of permissiveness in their do-
mestic regimes do not undermine the efforts of other states to restrict use to 
medical and scientific purposes. This can be gleaned from the Single Con-
vention’s identification of “international co-operation” as the means to 
achieve its goal.88 The duties of the Single Convention are duties of interna-
tional cooperation—not those of domestic legal harmonization. In both the 
Single Convention and the 1988 Convention there is a clear contrast be-
tween the unequivocal obligations that relate directly and indirectly to the 
85. See Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 12(4)–(5) (Can.).
86. Int’l Narcotics Control Bd., Training Material: 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, at 10–11, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2005/NAR_1 (2005).
87. The first international drug convention was the 1912 Hague International Opium 
Convention, which covered opium, morphine, cocaine and heroin. U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS &
CRIME, 2008 WORLD DRUG REPORT, at 188, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XI.1 (2008). The 1912 
Hague Convention included restrictions on the import and export of opium. Id. at 190. This 
was followed by the 1925 International Opium Conventions, which extended the scope of 
control to cannabis. Id. at 193. The 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regu-
lating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs built further on this, restricting manufacturing and 
introducing the notion of drug scheduling, id. at 195, although it did not explicitly discuss 
cannabis. The 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 
while explicitly addressing extradition over drug-related crimes committed abroad, failed to 
gain much traction as many states failed to sign it, including the United States, which viewed 
it as not far-reaching enough. Id. at 196. 
88. Single Convention, supra note 5, at pmbl.
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aim of preventing trafficking and the requirements that concern a state’s 
control of the use and abuse of drugs by its own nationals. These latter re-
quirements are qualified by respect for domestic “constitutional principles” 
and basic legal concepts and contain significant discretion to determine the 
precise nature of criminal offenses and any defenses (which could be read to 
include justifications and excuses) to those offenses.
While the restrictive or prohibitive provisions of the Single Convention 
can be understood, overall, as designed to require that states cooperate to 
outlaw and prevent international trade or trafficking in drugs, the obliga-
tions of member states with respect to addressing the problem of drug abuse 
within their own countries are of quite a different character. As Article 38 of 
the Single Convention (“Measures Against the Abuse of Drugs”) states, 
“[t]he Parties shall give special attention to and take all practicable 
measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs and for the early identifica-
tion, treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration 
of the persons involved and shall coordinate their efforts to these ends[.]”89
The Convention notably does not limit what counts as “practicable 
measures” to only those that entail outright criminalization of cannabis. 
Thus, state parties have latitude to explore other means to achieve the trea-
ty’s purpose.
Canada’s experience with the failure of criminalization of possession 
and use to counter drug abuse is well-documented in the studies and reports 
underpinning Canada’s new approach.90 The objective of curbing drug 
abuse through an alternative system with a narrow path for legal possession 
and use, where the circumstances of sale are determined and controlled by 
the government, seems justified under the provisions of the drug conven-
tions. Indeed, the relationship between the obligation in 4(c) of the Single 
Convention and the obligation to prevent drug abuse and related human 
harms in Article 38 of the Single Convention would necessarily have to be 
read in light of five decades of experience with criminalization of posses-
sion and use as a means of dealing with the harm from drug abuse. A large 
body of evidence has accumulated, showing how criminalization of posses-
sion and use have in fact made the “early identification, treatment, educa-
89. Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 38 (emphasis added).
90. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11. The Task Force recommended 
the regulation of wholesale distribution as well as retail sales of cannabis by provinces and 
territories, with various limitations. Id. at 4. Importantly, the Task Force noted: “Despite en-
forcement efforts under these treaties, cannabis remains the most widely used illicit drug in 
the world. Although the ultimate aim of the drug treaties is to ensure the ‘health and welfare 
of humankind,’ there is growing recognition that cannabis prohibition has proven to be an in-
effective strategy for reducing individual or social harms, including decreasing burdens on 
criminal justice systems, limiting negative social and public health impacts, and minimizing 
the entrenchment of illicit markets, which in some cases support organized crime and vio-
lence.” Id. at 10.
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tion, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the persons in-
volved” in drug abuse more difficult.91
Without a real-world experiment such as Canada’s, it would be almost 
impossible to determine whether an alternative approach to the criminaliza-
tion model could be more effective in addressing the social costs of canna-
bis use. The exception for scientific research in Article 2(5)(b) of the Single 
Convention suggests that more and better information is a valuable tool in 
understanding drug use and its prevention and promotes the aims of the 
Convention. The ICJ accepted in a different context in the Whaling in the 
Antarctic case that, in principle, a scientific research purpose might be in-
voked, even if the conduct in question has additional purposes beyond sci-
entific research.92
In this sense, the goal of progress in understanding the means of effec-
tively dealing with drug abuse and collateral human harms is served by
Canada’s experiment. This does not mean that we advocate such a broad 
meaning for the scientific research exception in the Single Convention that 
could fully justify Canada’s departure from basic obligations of the Conven-
tions. Rather, the search for more effective approaches to the social harms 
from cannabis use is a goal that is consistent with the aims of the Conven-
tions. As such, the various flexibilities for deviation from a criminalization 
model should be interpreted generously in Canada’s case, as it is not seek-
ing to undermine the drug conventions. As the WTO Appellate Body ob-
served in the EC-Hormones case, there are instances where the science re-
quired to inform policy can only be taken in “the real world where people 
91. See, e.g., NIAMH EASTWOOD ET AL., A QUIET REVOLUTION: DRUG 
DECRIMINALISATION ACROSS THE GLOBE (2016). Eastwood et al. point out that simple pos-
session offenses account for around 83 per cent of all drug-related offences globally. Id. at 6. 
The report further notes that drug-enforcement policies do not correlate to levels of drugs use, 
with jurisdictions that criminalize more harshly seeing some of the highest rates of drug use. 
Id. at 38; see also Commission of Narcotic Drugs Res. 55/12, U.N. Doc. E/2012/28-
E/CN.7/2012/18, at 30–33 (March 16, 2012) (recognizing that alternatives to imprisonment 
have “for some Member States, provided a successful means of promoting social reintegration 
with full respect for human rights,” while at the same time acknowledging that “for some 
Member States the application of alternative measures to prosecution and imprisonment of 
drug-using offenders is not provided for in national legislation and so is not applicable . . . .”). 
This equivocation highlights the tensions between different domestic approaches to drug con-
trol, a tension that is at the heart of the debate over cannabis legalization. See U.N. OFFICE OF 
DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2018 –EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at 27, U.N. Sales No. 
E.18.XI.9 (2018) (stating that “[t]he flexibility inherent in the international drug control con-
ventions should, to the maximum extent possible, be used to offer individuals (men, women 
and children) with drug use disorders the possibility to choose treatment as an alternative to 
conviction or punishment.”). In particular, women face additional challenges when incarcer-
ated for drug-related offenses.
92. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v Japan), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 97 
(Mar. 31).
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live and work and die.” 93 Many countries are currently rethinking their ap-
proach to cannabis and to drug abuse more generally.94 In these circum-
stances, Canada’s experiment has the possibility of providing indispensable 
information about the kinds of real-world effects that might emerge from a 
regulated legal access alternative.
B. The 1988 Convention and Canadian Constitutional Principles
We now turn to the 1988 Convention, which we consider on its own 
terms while taking into account the above observations concerning the Sin-
gle Convention where they are directly relevant. We must always bear in 
mind that (as already noted) Article 25 of the 1988 Convention provides that 
the 1988 Convention is not to be interpreted so as either to diminish or add 
to any of the rights and obligations in the Single Convention.
Article 14(4) of the 1988 Convention states, “[t]he Parties shall adopt 
appropriate measures aimed at eliminating or reducing illicit demand for 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, with a view to reducing human 
suffering and eliminating financial incentives for illicit traffic.”95 As has 
been previously observed, there is a wide variety of evidence and increasing 
recognition by many states parties to the drug conventions that traditional 
criminalization approaches are ineffective in this regard. Rather, these ap-
proaches perversely sustain demand for illicitly traded drugs and increase 
human suffering from the collateral criminal activities and organizations 
sustained through a criminalization approach. As Canada’s federal govern-
ment indicated, the objectives of the cannabis legalization scheme are, in 
significant measure, to address the ineffectiveness and perverse conse-
quences—”human suffering”—of a criminalization model for fighting drug 
abuse.96
93. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 187, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R; WT/DS48/AB/R, (adopted 
Feb. 13, 1998).
94. See generally GLOB. LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., LAW LIBRARY OF CONG.,
DECRIMINALIZATION OF NARCOTICS (2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/decriminalization-
of-narcotics/decriminalization-of-narcotics.pdf [hereinafter DECRIMINALIZATION OF 
NARCOTICS].
95. 1988 Convention, supra note 5, art. 14, ¶ 4.
96. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16 § 7 (Can.) (“The purpose of this Act is to protect 
public health and public safety, and, in particular, to : (a) protect the health of young persons 
by restricting their access to cannabis; . . . (d) deter illicit activities in relation to cannabis 
through appropriate sanctions and enforcement measures; (e) reduce the burden on the crimi-
nal justice system in relation to cannabis; (f) provide access to a quality-controlled supply of 
cannabis . . . .”); see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 2 (“In taking a public health 
approach to the regulation of cannabis, the Task Force proposes measures that will maintain 
and improve the health of Canadians by minimizing the harms associated with cannabis 
use.”); id. at 10 (“While it is not part of the Task Force’s mandate to make recommendations 
to the Government on how to address its international commitments, it is our view that Cana-
da’s proposal to legalize cannabis shares the objectives agreed to by member states in multi-
lateral declarations, namely: to protect vulnerable citizens, particularly youth; to implement 
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Under the 1988 Convention, a member state is only required to provide 
criminal penalties for possession and use of cannabis “[s]ubject to its consti-
tutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system . . . .”97 Article 
3(4)(c) provides that, “in appropriate cases of a minor nature, the Parties 
may provide, as alternatives to conviction or punishment, measures such as 
education, rehabilitation or social reintegration . . . .”98 Article 3(11) further 
provides: “Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the 
description of the offences to which it refers and of legal defences thereto is 
reserved to the domestic law of a Party and that such offences shall be pros-
ecuted and punished in conformity with that law.”99 Taken together, these 
three provisions reflect a significant amount of discretion for each state Par-
ty to balance criminal law-based approaches with other methods of address-
ing the social harms from cannabis.
With this observation in mind, we now examine whether, under Article 
3(2) of the 1988 Convention, Canada’s “constitutional principles and the 
basic concepts of its legal system” provide a basis for Canada to deviate 
from criminal penalties for possession and use of cannabis. One important 
source for Canada’s “constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its 
legal system” is the public and constitutional jurisprudence of its highest 
court, the Supreme Court of Canada.
In order to appreciate the nature of “constitutional principles” in Cana-
da, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of Canadian constitutionalism and 
the relationship of the courts to the legislative branch of government in par-
ticular.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Canadian “constitutional 
principles” include not only written provisions of the Canadian constitution-
al document—the Constitution Act of 1982—but also unwritten principles 
that are deep structural features of the Canadian constitutional system, such 
as federalism and the rule of law.100 The contours and meaning of the Con-
stitution—including constitutional rights in the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, an integral part of the Constitutional Act of 1982—are determined by 
the interaction of judicial interpretation with the legislative branches.101 Un-
der Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, rights are guaranteed 
subject to “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
evidence-based policy; and to put public health, safety and welfare at the heart of a balanced 
approach to treaty implementation.”). 
97. 1988 Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, ¶ 2.
98. Id. art. 3, 4(c).
99. 1988 Convention, supra note 5, art. 3, ¶ 11.
100. See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg & Cara F. Zwibel, The Rule of Law in the Supreme Court 
of Canada, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 715, 723–26, 726 n.50 (2005).
101. See ALTA. CIVIL LIBERTIES RESEARCH CTR., STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE:
IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDING EXECUTIVE POWERS FOR CANADIAN DEMOCRACY (2016).
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justified in a free and democratic society.”102 Thus, in applying the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court considers first of all whether a 
constitutional interest is engaged under one of the specified rights in the 
Charter—for example, Section 7, which includes “security of the person.” If 
the Court does find a constitutional interest that is affected by the law in 
question, it will then go on to consider whether the law may nevertheless be 
upheld as a justified limit to rights, including under the general limitations 
clause, Section 1.
Canada’s “constitutional principles” are articulated not only through ju-
dicial review but also through the practice of the legislative branch, particu-
larly in adapting legislation to the requirements of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms as social circumstances and beliefs in Canada evolve. Brian Slat-
tery articulates a theory of the Charter that has been highly influential:
[t]he proposition that governments and legislatures are bound to 
advert to Charter standards in their activities does not mean that 
they have to proceed in the same manner as courts. We have to ban-
ish the notion that the only proper mode of applying the Charter is 
the judicial one, characterized by a slow and deliberate adversarial 
process featuring arguments by the parties affected and a reasoned 
decision. Such a process may be neither possible nor desirable in 
the case of many governmental actors.103
In setting out the government’s agenda in embarking upon reform of canna-
bis laws in Canada, the 2015 Speech from the Throne refers to the objective, 
inter alia, of “protecting our cherished rights and freedoms[,]” arguably an 
allusion to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and related instruments for 
the protection of rights and freedoms at the provincial level of govern-
ment.104
In a trio of 2003 cases, R. v. Clay,105 R. v. Caine,106 and R. v. Malmo-
Levine107 (the cannabis trilogy), a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada 
held that criminalization of possession of cannabis with the possibility of 
incarceration engaged the constitutional interest in Section 7 of the Charter 
of “life, liberty and security of the person.” However, in addition to being 
limited by Section 1, the right to life, liberty, and security of the person is 
102. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K.).
103. Brian Slattery, A Theory of the Charter, 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 701, 719 (1987) 
(italicization in original). 
104. Governor Gen. David Johnston, Making Real Change Happen: Speech from the 
Throne to Open the First Session of the Forty-second Parliament of Canada (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/campaigns/speech-throne/making-real-change-
happen.html (emphasis added).
105. R. v. Clay, [2003] SCC 75 (Can.).
106. R. v. Caine, [2003] SCC 74 (Can.).
107. R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] SCC 74 (Can.).
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limited within Section 7 itself; the state may deprive an individual of this 
right where doing so is “in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.” In the 1993 Canadian Supreme Court case Rodriguez v. British Co-
lumbia (Attorney General), Justice Sopinka defined fundamental justice in 
his dissent in the following terms: “[principles of fundamental justice] are 
‘fundamental’ in the sense that they would have general acceptance among 
reasonable people.”108 The majority in R. v. Caine and R. v. Malmo-Levine
cited that definition, finding that:
The requirement of “general acceptance among reasonable people” 
enhances the legitimacy of judicial review of state action, and en-
sures that the values against which state action is measured are not 
just fundamental “in the eye of the beholder only.” In short, for a 
rule or principle to constitute a principle of fundamental justice for 
the purposes of s[ection]. 7, it must be a legal principle about which 
there is significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the 
way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must 
be identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable stand-
ard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security 
of the person.109
For the majority in the cannabis trilogy, criminalizing cannabis posses-
sion and use with the threat of incarceration did not offend the Canadian so-
cial consensus on justice as the Court understood Canadian community 
standards in 2003. The dissenters, by contrast, conceived of the harm prin-
ciple—that is, the notion that an individual should not be subject to penalty 
for an act that does no harm to others—as part of the conception of “funda-
mental justice” in Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms. A key element in the approach of the majority is its understanding of 
the proper relationship of the Court to the legislative branch in the function-
ing of Section 7. According to the majority, the legislative branch has a 
large role in gauging social consensus concerning justice—that is, funda-
mental justice—and thus in determining the contours of the right to life, lib-
erty, and security of the person under Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Further, while laws that are arbitrary and irrational will violate 
Section 7, Parliament has a large role in determining what is justified on the 
evidence and what is thus, in the constitutional sense, not arbitrary or irra-
tional: “Members of Parliament are elected to make these sorts of decisions, 
and have access to a broader range of information, more points of view, and 
a more flexible investigative process than courts do.”110
108. Rodriguez v. B.C. (Att’y Gen.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, 607 (Can.) (Sopinka, J., dis-
senting).
109. Malmo-Levine, Caine, [2003] SCC 74, ¶ 113 (citation omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
110. Id. ¶ 133.
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Given the Supreme Court of Canada’s notion of “fundamental justice” 
under the Constitution as a matter of “social consensus” or contemporary 
community standards, and given the large role it assigns to the legislative 
branch in determining the justification for lawmaking that may result in 
deprivation of life, liberty, and security of the person, it would be difficult to 
conclude that the Canadian government’s decision to proceed with a scheme 
for legalization of recreational cannabis under government control is irrele-
vant to “constitutional principles” within the meaning of the 1988 Conven-
tion.111
Simply put, the social consensus on justice discerned by the majority in 
the cannabis trilogy in 2003 has evolved such that “fundamental justice” to-
day—as understood in Canadian society—is largely inconsistent with crim-
inal penalties for possession and use of cannabis. The extensive consultation 
and polling112 and bipartisan,113 provincial government support for a legali-
zation scheme arguably reflect a shifting of the social justice norm such that 
Canada’s constitutional principles, particularly the principle of “fundamen-
tal justice,” do indeed limit the continuing commitment under the 1988 
Convention to criminal penalties for possession and use.
The various flexibilities or limitations with respect to a state’s approach 
to use of cannabis by its own citizens discussed above, as well as the object 
and purpose as revealed by, for example, the preamble of the Single Con-
vention, may not be sufficient to make every aspect of Canada’s cannabis 
scheme compatible with the drug conventions. But they are surely adequate 
to establish that Article 4(c) of the Single Convention in particular is neither 
absolute in nature nor is a preemptory norm as asserted by the INCB. As the 
obligation is “subject to” other provisions of the Single Convention and, ac-
cordingly, is far from being of a preempting or trumping character, the obli-
111. See, e.g., Andrew D. Hathaway, Charter Rights of Canadian Drug Users: A Consti-
tutional Assessment of The Clay Trial and Ruling, 16 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 29, 37–39, 41–42
(2001).
112. See, e.g., NAVIGATOR, CANNABIS IN CANADA 2 (2018) (based on an online poll of 
1200 Canadians, 42% supported the legalization of cannabis); ORACLEPOLL RESEARCH &
COLIN FIRTH, CANADIAN CANNABIS REPORT: WHAT’S THE BUZZ? REPORT OVERVIEW
(2017) (according to a telephone poll of 5000 Canadian residents, 57% supported the federal 
government’s decision to legalize cannabis, 53% had a positive opinion of medical marijuana, 
and 26% currently consume cannabis products); see also Jen Skerritt, Why the World Is 
Watching Canada’s Pot Legalization, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2018, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-06/why-the-world-is-watching-canada-s-
pot-legalization-quicktake; Jesse Tahirali, 7 in 10 Canadians Support Marijuana Legaliza-
tion: Nanos Poll, CTV NEWS (June 30, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/7-
in-10-canadians-support-marijuana-legalization-nanos-poll-1.2968953.
113. Canada’s cannabis legalization bill was passed in November 2017 by the House of 
Commons by a vote of 200 to 82. It was passed by the senate on June 19, 2018 with a vote of 
52 to 29 with two abstentions. See Rachel Aiello, Timeline of Key Events in Marijuana Bill’s
Passage Through Parliament, CTV NEWS (June 4, 2018, 2:35 PM), 
https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/timeline-of-key-events-in-marijuana-bill-s-passage-through-
parliament-1.3958662. 
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gation is subordinate to and conditioned by other provisions in the Conven-
tion. With respect to the 1988 Convention, the very fact that the obligation 
to impose penal sanctions on possession and use of cannabis is subject to 
domestic “constitutional principles” and basic legal concepts illustrates that 
this obligation is not a sine qua non, or preemptory norm.
The considerations advanced above put into serious question the notion 
that Canada is unequivocally violating a sine qua non of the UN Conven-
tions by moving to a regulated legal use model for recreational cannabis. At 
the same time, it is far from clear that every aspect of Canada’s scheme 
could be upheld under the Single Convention and/or the 1988 Convention. 
For instance, Canada might have moved to an alternative system of “light” 
or “soft” penal sanctions, eschewing imprisonment and creating the kind of 
offense that does not entail the stigma of a criminal record instead of mov-
ing to fully legalized, albeit regulated, recreational use. The alternative of 
“soft” penal sanctions might be more in accord with the flexibilities of the 
Conventions than the approach chosen by Canada. As an experiment in ef-
fective alternatives to criminalization, Canada could have chosen a more 
limited regime with provisions for review after a defined time period (for 
instance, limited distribution of cannabis without a medical prescription to 
adults). Instead, Canada’s scheme foresees significant investments of a 
long-term nature in businesses for the growth, distribution, and sale of rec-
reational cannabis.
Yet, rather than engaging in a dialogue with Canada concerning its ap-
proach to legalization, the INCB largely remained aloof and generally failed 
to engage constructively with other countries developing approaches that 
deviate from the criminalization model. At the same time, Canada’s gov-
ernment did not attempt a full-scale justification for its cannabis scheme 
through the considerations discussed above. Instead, the government moved 
ahead with an approach that it acknowledges in some ways creates tensions 
with the international conventions.114
Accordingly, Canada seems to be preparing itself to denounce (with-
draw) from UN Conventions or perhaps may be hopeful that, in a not unrea-
114. See, for example, the response of Minister Chrystia Freeland during Senate Ques-
tion Period in March 2017 to a question regarding concerns by the Minister of the Health that 
Canada would be in contravention of the international drug conventions upon legalization: 
“As for our government’s plan to legalize marijuana and the impact of this decision on our 
international treaties, my colleague, the Minister of Health, is quite right.” 150 DEBS. OF THE 
S. 2488 (March 8, 2017) (Can.), https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/chamber/421/debates/
102db_2017-03-07-e#52; see also Hearing on Bill C-45, An Act Respecting Cannabis and to 
Amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Criminal Code and Other Acts Before 
the Standing S. Comm. on Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade Evidence, 42nd Parliament (2018) 
(statement of Mark Gwozdecky, Assistant Deputy Minister, Int’l Security & Political Affairs, 
Glob. Affairs Can.) (Can.) (“As Minister Freeland acknowledged in early March 2017, during 
Senate Question Period, the government recognizes that Canada’s proposed approach to can-
nabis will result in Canada being in contravention of certain obligations related to cannabis 
under the UN drug conventions.”), https://sencanada.ca/en/Content/SEN/Committee/421/
aefa/53882-e. 
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sonable period of time, a change in attitude will lead to cannabis being de-
scheduled from the Conventions. In the case of medical cannabis, the UN, 
through the WHO, already began the process of reviewing cannabis, which 
may eventually lead to its removal from the schedule of Class 1 drugs (those 
to which the most restrictive treatment applies under the Conventions).115 In 
2011, Bolivia denounced the Single Convention then rejoined the Conven-
tion with a reservation for coca leaf consumption “for cultural and medici-
nal purposes.”116 The Single Convention allows reservations upon acceding 
to the Convention and thus Canada could attempt the same strategy of de-
nouncing then filing a reservation for cannabis as it rejoined the Conven-
tion. Under Article 50(3) of the Single Convention, a reservation shall be 
accepted by the states parties as valid, unless objected to by at least one-
third of the state parties.117
By presenting Canada’s cannabis scheme as an unequivocal violation of 
a sine qua non of the 1961 Single Convention, the INCB may be attempting 
to foreclose the approach of denunciation then re-accession by reservation 
by arguing that Article 4(c) is an obligation not susceptible to reservation. 
This, however, is contrary to the plain text of Article 50(3), which provides 
a list of provisions that may not be subject to reservations but does not in-
clude Article 4(c) as one of the provisions of the Convention subject to res-
ervations. Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides that a reservation may not be made that is “is incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty.” But, as we have argued extensively 
above, Canada’s scheme is in many respects compatible with the various 
purposes of the 1961 Single Convention and the 1988 Convention. Canada 
has moved to the legalization of recreational cannabis through a system of 
government-controlled and government-overseen production, sale, and con-
sumption precisely in order to more effectively address the social costs of 
cannabis use, and especially the illicit commerce in cannabis. By prohibiting 
import and export of recreational cannabis, Canada ensures that legalization 
will not create avenues by which cannabis can enter into the stream of illicit 
115. Scott Gacek, WHO Takes First Steps to Reclassify Medical Cannabis Under Inter-
national Law, MED. JANE (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.medicaljane.com/2017/01/01/who-
takes-first-steps-to-reclassify-medical-cannabis-under-international-law/.
116. See MARTIN JELSMA ET AL., BALANCING TREATY STABILITY AND CHANGE: INTER 
SE MODIFICATION OF THE UN DRUG CONTROL CONVENTIONS TO FACILITATE CANNABIS 
REGULATION 30–31 (2018).
117. Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 50, ¶ 3 (“A State which desires to become a 
Party but wishes to be authorized to make reservations other than those made in accordance 
with paragraph 2 of this article or with article 49 may inform the Secretary-General of such 
intention. Unless by the end of twelve months after the date of the Secretary-General’s com-
munication of the reservation concerned, this reservation has been objected to by one third of 
the States that have ratified or acceded to this Convention before the end of that period, it shall 
be deemed to be permitted, it being understood however that States which have objected to the 
reservation need not assume towards the reserving State any legal obligation under this Con-
vention which is affected by the reservation.”).
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international commerce, undermining the different drug control policies of 
other countries contrary to the Conventions’ objectives of international co-
operation and coordination.
III.  Canada’s Act in Light of the 
International Human Rights Framework
A. International Human Rights Framework
So far, we have considered the UN drug control and anti-trafficking 
frameworks as reflected in the Conventions as a “self-contained regime”118
of international law, considering only the interpretation of the rights and ob-
ligations of this regime in relation to domestic law. However, as already 
noted, under the VCLT, a treaty interpreter must also examine the provi-
sions of a treaty being interpreted in light of other relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable between the parties.119
Even beyond this canon of treaty interpretation, there is a growing body 
of scholarly literature that insists that the UN drug framework and the UN 
human rights framework are both part of the UN legal system as a whole. 
As such, UN drug and UN human rights law ought to be interpreted in a 
consistent manner so as to avoid tension between the rights and obligations 
of the two regimes. Further, some scholars argue on the basis of references 
to human rights in the UN Charter that the human rights framework has a 
higher legal status than the drug framework. Therefore, where there is in-
consistency between the frameworks, the human rights one must prevail.120
United Nations practice supports this view; numerous General Assembly 
resolutions and other (admittedly, non-binding) statements of the UN human 
rights bodies indicate that the UN drug regime must be interpreted in favor 
of human rights law.121
While there is no question that the UN Charter provides that the legal 
obligations of the Charter would take precedence over conflicting require-
118. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, at 68, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (“In a narrow sense, the term is used to denote a special set of 
secondary rules under the law of State responsibility that claims primacy to the general rules 
concerning consequences of a violation. In a broader sense, the term is used to refer to interre-
lated wholes of primary and secondary rules, sometimes also referred to as ‘systems’ or ‘sub-
systems’ of rules that cover some particular problem differently from the way it would be 
covered under general law.”).
119. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 76, art. 31, ¶ 3(c).
120. Barrett, supra note 6, at 29. 
121. See generally Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Study on the Im-
pact of the World Drug Problem on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/30/65 (Sept. 4, 2015); G.A. Res. 69/201, International Cooperation Against the World 
Drug Problem, ¶ 2 (Feb. 21, 2015). 
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ments in an ordinary treaty,122 the Charter only refers to human rights in a 
general manner.123 Specific human rights obligations are themselves con-
tained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two main hu-
man rights treaties: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(the “ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the “ICESCR”). While there are a few human rights that 
are generally considered to establish peremptory norms of international law, 
such as the prohibitions on torture and on genocide,124 these are not relevant 
to the question of the international legality of Canada’s legalization of rec-
reational cannabis. The most persuasive reading of the legal sources and UN 
practice is that both the drug and human rights frameworks are UN treaty 
regimes and that the drug framework should be interpreted and applied con-
sistently or harmoniously with the human rights framework to the extent 
permitted by the legal requirements of both frameworks.
Canada is bound by both of the UN treaties on human rights.125 These 
treaties require the states bound by them ensure that the rights in question 
become part of their basic domestic law. Article 2.2 of the ICCPR reads:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative measures, 
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the 
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and 
with the provisions of the present Covenant to adopt such laws or 
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights rec-
ognized in the present Covenant.126
As is clear from this provision, Canada, as a state bound by the Covenant, is 
required to make the rights in the Covenant part of its domestic legal sys-
tem. Thus, in our view, what is most relevant in assessing the international 
legality of Canada’s scheme for legal recreational cannabis is that, by virtue 
of its obligations under the ICCPR, the human rights in the ICCPR are to be 
considered basic concepts of Canada’s legal system within the meaning of 
the 1988 Convention. Thus, Canada’s obligation under the Single and 1988 
Conventions to establish penal sanctions for non-medical and non-scientific 
use of cannabis is “subject to” its international human rights obligations un-
der the ICCPR. A similar situation exists with respect to the ICESCR, which 
122. U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any oth-
er international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”). 
123. U.N. Charter art. 13(1)(b), for instance, mentions human rights generally in the 
context of General Assembly recommendations.
124. See generally Dire Tadli (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on Jus Cogens, ¶ 57, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/693 (Mar. 8, 2016).
125. International Human Rights Treaties to Which Canada is a Party, DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/abt-apd/icg-gci/ihrl-didp/tcp.html (last updated Nov. 14, 2016).
126. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, ¶ 2, Dec. 19, 1966,
T.I.A.S. No. 92-908, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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contains the right to health, although the obligation to implement in domes-
tic law is qualified by the capacities of the particular state at the time in 
question.127
Uruguay, which legalized recreational cannabis prior to Canada, has re-
sorted largely to the invocation of international human rights obligations in 
order to justify legalization as a departure from the otherwise applicable re-
quirements of the UN drug conventions.128 In defending its legalization in 
UN bodies, Uruguay has referred to the threats to human life, security, and 
health that come from the consequence of continuing to pursue a criminali-
zation strategy: the human costs of the war on drugs and the operation of the 
drug market by organized crime are well known in Latin America.129 Cana-
dian officials and legislators also considered these costs in deciding to adopt 
an alternative scheme.130 The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
previously condoned the liberalization of drug laws as contributing to hu-
man rights obligations in at least one instance, that of Portugal.131 The de-
criminalization—though not legalization132—of drugs covered by the UN 
framework in Portugal was found by the High Commissioner as contrib-
127. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of eve-
ryone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”); see 
also ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, at xix (Scott 
Leckie & Anne Gallagher eds., 2006) (“While the norms found in the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights may or may not be directly subject to a complaint procedure within 
domestic law, this text must still play a significant role in the application and interpretation of 
domestic law. At a minimum, the judicial bodies of States parties should consider internation-
al human rights law as an interpretive aid to domestic law and ensure that domestic law is in-
terpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the provisions of international human rights 
instruments to which a State is bound. Judges should ensure that any decisions they issue do 
not result in the relevant government violating the terms of a treaty which it has ratified.”). 
128. See John Walsh & Geoff Ramsey, Uruguay’s Drug Policy: Major Innovations, Ma-
jor Challenges, BROOKINGS, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Walsh-
Uruguay-final.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
129. See John Hudak et al., Uruguay’s Cannabis Law: Pioneering a New Paradigm,
BROOKINGS (Mar. 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/gs_
032118_uruguaye28099s-cannabis-law_final.pdf; see also Marihuana: Uruguay se Defendió 
ante ONU, MONTEVIDEO PORTAL (Mar. 13, 2014, 9:24 PM), http://www.montevideo.com.uy/
Noticias/Marihuana-Uruguay-se-defendio-ante-ONU-uc228901?plantilla=1391.
130. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 68–69 (“The Canadian Centre on Sub-
stance Abuse estimated that, based on 2002 data, public costs associated with the administra-
tion of justice for illicit drug use (including police, prosecutors, courts, correctional services) 
amounted to approximately $2.3 billion annually.”); see also S. SPECIAL COMM. ON ILLEGAL 
DRUGS, 37TH PARLIAMENT, CANNABIS: OUR POSITION FOR A CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY 30, 
(Sept. 2002) (Can.) (estimating that the cost of law enforcement and the justice system relat-
ing to cannabis in Canada was between $300–500 million per year).
131. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 121, ¶ 30.
132. Decriminalization without legalization can involve the replacement of criminal law 
sanctions with softer penalties that do not carry the stigma of a criminal record, or exceptions 
for possession and use of very small quantities, while possession and use, as well as buying 
and selling, remain generally illegal. 
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uting to the right to health. By avoiding the stigmatization and other harms 
associated with criminal convictions and penalties, the revictimization of 
those with existing drug dependencies is also avoided.133
Another human rights issue is that Canada’s criminal justice system, 
like the United States’, disproportionately charges vulnerable minority 
groups with cannabis possession offenses. In the Canadian case, this is sys-
tematically true for black and indigenous people.134 This inequity in law en-
forcement arguably engages the right of non-discrimination under the 
ICCPR. Reform of the criminal justice system is necessary to address and 
reduce discrimination in law enforcement. Removing possession and use of 
cannabis from the criminal justice system, as Canada has done, is arguably, 
in the short term, a more effective remedy to discrimination in relation to 
drug possession than attempting to alter the culture of law enforcement 
across the country, which is a much larger and more difficult task, albeit one 
that might be imperative from a human rights point of view. While canna-
bis-related offenses are by no means the only area where discrimination in 
law enforcement exists, police typically are able to exercise a wide range of 
discretion with respect to when and against whom cannabis-related charges 
are laid.
B. Cannabis and International Human Rights Jurisprudence
The cannabis-related decisions of a range of international and domestic 
tribunals have incorporated international human rights principles and related 
concepts in domestic constitutional and human rights law. As noted in the 
previous Section of this Article, Article 38 of the ICJ Statute indicates that 
decisions of domestic and international tribunals are secondary or supple-
mentary sources of international law.
In the Prince v. South Africa case, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee considered the claim of a Rastafarian that use of cannabis was a 
tenet of his religion and that South Africa’s laws against possession of can-
nabis violated his exercise of that right. 135 The UN Committee held that the 
prohibition of the possession and use of cannabis was a “limitation on [the 
claimant’s] freedom to manifest his religion,” which was protected under 
Article 18 (1) of the ICCPR. However, the Committee went on to find that 
this limitation of the right was justified as a measure prescribed by law “to 
protect public safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights and 
133. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 121, ¶ 30.
134. Rachel Browne, Black and Indigenous People are Overrepresented in Canada’s
Weed Arrests, VICE NEWS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_ca/article/d35eyq/black-
and-indigenous-people-are-overrepresented-in-canadas-weed-arrests (citing police statistics 
from across the country, obtained through freedom of information requests to the relevant au-
thorities). 
135. Prince v. S. Afr., Communication No. 1474/2006, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
¶ 3.1, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/91/D1474/2006 (Nov. 14, 2007).
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freedoms of others, based on the harmful effects of cannabis.”136 The Com-
mittee gave considerable deference to South Africa’s determinations con-
cerning what is necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, as well as the state’s deter-
mination concerning the harmful effects of cannabis.137
In Arriola, Sebastien y Otros, the Supreme Court of Argentina held that 
the country’s criminal prohibition of cannabis possession and use violated 
Argentina’s constitution.138 In its analysis, the Supreme Court followed the 
doctrine that human rights protections under the UN Covenants and the 
American Convention of Human Rights (the latter of which Canada is not a 
party to) were part of Argentina’s constitutional order. The country’s crimi-
nal prohibition of possession and use violated, for example, “the right to be 
free of arbitrary or abusive interference with private life” found in Article 
17.1 of the ICCPR.139 The Argentina Court also referred to the notion of 
human dignity in the Preamble of the ICCPR when questioning whether tar-
geting mere consumers of cannabis in the war against illicit trafficking of 
drugs was compatible with the conception of human dignity underpinning 
the ICCPR, which implies that human beings must not be simply used as 
means to ends.140
More recently, the Constitutional Court of South Africa upheld in large 
part a decision of the High Court of Cape Town, which found that South Af-
rica’s criminalization of possession and use of cannabis that extended to 
private places violated the right to privacy in South Africa’s constitution. 
The Constitutional Court further found that the harmful effects of cannabis 
were not such as to justify criminalization of possession and use as a rea-
sonable limit on the right to privacy prescribed by law.141 The South African 
Constitutional Court did not refer explicitly to the right in the ICCPR to be 
free of arbitrary or abusive interference with private life. Yet the finding 
that criminalization of possession and use could not be justified under law 
as a reasonable limit on rights has a bearing on the interpretation of the 
ICCPR. Interference with private life is much more likely to be “arbitrary or 
abusive” if it cannot be justified as a reasonable limit on privacy prescribed 
by law.
Canada has undertaken binding international human rights obligations 
and is required to implement these as basic concepts of the domestic legal 
136. Id. ¶ 7.3.
137. See RICHARD LINES, DRUG CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 156 (2017).
138. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Jus-
tice], 25/8/2009, “Arriola, Sebastián y otros / Recurso de Hecho “, Fallos de la Corte Suprema 
de Justicia de la Nación [Fallos] (2009-332-1965) (Arg.). 
139. Id. ¶ 17.
140. Id. ¶ 18.
141. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Prince, [2018] ZACC 30 
(CC) (S. Afr.).
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system. Thus, Canada can circumscribe or limit the criminalization of pos-
session and use of cannabis in accord with such basic concepts. The ques-
tion still remains whether Canada’s deviation from the requirement of penal 
sanctions (with certain flexibilities) in the 1988 Convention is broader than 
that justified by the human rights concerns discussed above. In response to 
such concerns, other jurisdictions have, either through constitutional juris-
prudence (as in the cases of Argentina and South Africa discussed above) or 
through legislative reform, reduced penalties from criminal to civil or ad-
ministrative sanctions, which do not carry the stigma of a criminal record, or 
provided the possibility of use in private spaces such as an individual’s 
home or particular cafes or clubs (the Netherlands, for example).142 Besides 
Canada, Uruguay is the only other sovereign state that has a fully legal, al-
beit highly controlled and regulated, path for personal possession and use 
(such paths exist in some U.S. states, but these are still complicated by the 
retention of criminalization at the federal level in the United States, albeit 
with tolerance for the practice of the states).
In contrast with the lesser deviations from criminalization typical of 
most sovereign states’ reforms, the regulated scheme of recreational posses-
sion and use (controlled by permits and licenses) established by Canada 
shifts control over the cannabis economy from organized crime into the 
hands of government. Canada may well argue—with some persuasive-
ness—that other countries’ reforms, while protecting consumers of cannabis 
from the stigma and other risks of criminal sanction, do not address the hu-
man rights violations that result from the violence or other risks to life and 
health attendant upon the trade in drugs, including sale to consumers for 
personal use, arising from control on the part of criminal organizations. By 
taking these functions out of the hands of organized crime, Canada is argua-
bly improving human rights for all of its citizens.
In all of this discussion of legalization and decriminalization, it is nec-
essary to consider how previous drug convictions will be handled in a legal-
ized regime. The handling of criminal records arising from cannabis-related 
infractions is a significant human rights concern. An initial problem with 
Canada’s scheme was that Canada had yet to undertake the removal of crim-
inal records of persons who, in the past, have been stigmatized through 
criminal conviction with considerable harmful social consequences.143 While 
the Canadian government has made some progress in this area, the current 
scheme only pardons people convicted for possession of up to 30 grams of 
cannabis rather than automatically expunging their record.144 Such a pardon 
142. See generally DECRIMINALIZATION OF NARCOTICS, supra note 94.
143. Daniel LeBlanc, Canadians Convicted of Simple Cannabis Possession Will Soon be 
Able to Apply for a Pardon, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.
theglobeandmail.com/cannabis/article-amnesty-program-for-canadians-convicted-of-simple-
cannabis-possession/.
144. Id.
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is in fact merely a ‘record suspension,’ wherein the original conviction re-
mains on the record and falls far short of a full amnesty.145
Under Canadian law, there is a waiting period before convicted crimi-
nals may apply for a pardon (between three to ten years after the conviction) 
as well as an application fee of C$631. Recognizing that these are onerous 
requirements, and in light of the complete legalization of the substance pos-
session of which gave rise to the convictions, the Canadian government has 
opted to waive these requirements.146 Nevertheless, by requiring convicted 
offenders to apply for a pardon rather than automatically offering an ex-
pungement, the most vulnerable and discriminated-against members of 
communities in Canada continue to be disenfranchised.147 With more than 
500,000 Canadians having criminal convictions for possession of 30 grams 
or less of cannabis, empirical evidence shows that, across Canadian cities, 
black and indigenous people are overrepresented in possession-related ar-
rests.148
A bill currently before the Canadian parliament would amend this pro-
cedure to allow for full expungement of certain cannabis related convic-
tions.149 The proposed bill explicitly acknowledges the disproportionate 
conviction of marginalized and racialized communities in its preamble.150 It 
also clarifies that expungement will mean that “the person convicted of the 
offence is deemed never to have been charged with and convicted of that 
offence.”151 The proposed bill does continue to require that convicted indi-
viduals apply for an expungement order but specifies that no fee may be 
imposed for such an application.152 Compared to the system of pardons cur-
rently in place, the proposed bill would make significant strides in address-
ing the continued discrimination against minorities in Canada who were 
disproportionately affected by the previous criminalized cannabis regime. 
Until this bill or some iteration of it is passed, the continued possibility of 
victimization of parties who are often amongst the most discriminated-
against and vulnerable populations in Canada is in tension with some of the 
most compelling human rights arguments for decriminalization. The human 
145. See Benjamin Kates & Pam Hrick, Pardons Don’t go Far Enough. Convictions for 
Cannabis Possession Must Be Expunged, CBC (Oct. 29, 2018, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/opinion/cannabis-convictions-1.4876783. The authors of this piece 
are involved with Campaign for Cannabis Amnesty, the Canadian organization driving the 
movement for granting amnesty.
146. Amanda Connolly, Canadians with Past Pot Convictions Won’t Have To Pay or 
Wait To Apply for a Pardon, GLOBAL NEWS (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:48 AM), 
https://globalnews.ca/news/4563182/cannabis-pardon-marijuana-legalization-ralph-goodale/.
147. See Kates & Hrick, supra note 145.
148. Id.
149. An Act to Establish a Procedure for Expunging Certain Cannabis-Related Convic-
tions, Bill C-415, 42nd Parliament (2018) (Can.).
150. Id., at pmbl.
151. Id., art. 5, ¶ 1.
152. Id., art. 7, ¶¶ 1, 3.
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rights dimension to cannabis legalization is, as the above discussion sug-
gests, complex and multifaceted and offers an alternative justification for 
legalization that can coexist and potentially preempt the legal prescriptions 
enshrined in the international drug conventions. How cannabis legalization 
interacts with international economic law is a somewhat different question, 
giving rise to technical legal problems that exist alongside and as a conse-
quence of the international drug conventions and the international human 
rights regime.
IV.  Canada’s Act in Light of The 
International Economic Law Framework
As discussed in the previous Part, while the relationship of the interna-
tional human rights framework to the UN drug control and anti-trafficking 
framework is the subject of significant commentary,153 the international eco-
nomic law framework animates considerably less discussion in relation to 
drugs—and cannabis legalization in particular. This framework, in which 
the World Trade Organization (the “WTO”) occupies a central role, consists 
of numerous bilateral and regional agreements on trade and investment, in-
cluding the North American Free Trade Agreement (the “NAFTA”), to 
which Canada is a party along with the United States and Mexico. Canada, 
the United States, and Mexico recently negotiated a successor agreement to 
the NAFTA, the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (the “USMCA”), 
which still awaits approval by the U.S. Congress.154 In this Article, we con-
sider the rules of the WTO as exemplary of the international economic law 
framework and do not attempt the complex task of considering the implica-
tions of bilateral and regional agreements, which nevertheless usually dupli-
cate in key aspects the legal disciplines of the WTO.155
153. See, e.g., Saul Takahashi, Drug Control, Human Rights, and the Right to the High-
est Attainable Standard of Health: By No Means Straightforward Issues, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 748
(2009); see also Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Econ-
omy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT 
YEARBOOK 1999/2000, at 51 (Hugh Stokke & Arne Tostensen, eds., 2001).
154. See M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. NO.
R42965, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf. NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994, replac-
ing the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. On September 30, 2018, the United States, Mexi-
co and Canada came to an agreement on a revised trade deal (the United States, Mexico, Can-
ada Agreement or USMCA) that if approved, will replaced NAFTA. See Katie Lobosco, 
Donna Borak & Tami Luhby, What’s New in the US, Canada and Mexico Trade Deal?, CNN
(Oct. 1, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/01/politics/nafta-usmca-
differences/index.html.
155. For instance, WTO Members notify the WTO about regional trade agreements into 
which they enter. Many of the regional and bilateral trade agreements refer explicitly to the 
WTO and its agreements. See, e.g., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership art. 1.1, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/Comprehensive-and-
Progressive-Agreement-for-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-CPTPP-English.pdf (incorporating by 
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A. The Relationship Between International Economic Law and the 
UN Drug Regime
The WTO is a multilateral organization governing trade among nations 
based upon obligations its Member States undertake through a series of 
multilateral and plurilateral treaty instruments.156 The purpose of the WTO 
is “the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and . . . the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.”157
More controversially, the WTO has become a vehicle for limiting regulatory 
diversity in some areas of policy that are thought to affect the real value of 
the market access created by the removal of direct barriers to trade.158 The 
WTO has a complex legal regime regulating international trade, and coun-
tries that are members of the WTO must abide by these rules. If they do not, 
they can be brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement body for violating
WTO rules by other Member States.159
A fundamental, and indeed primary, purpose of the UN drug conven-
tions is to place obligations on states to prevent, prohibit, and punish drug 
trafficking. In doing so, the conventions classify trade in drugs covered un-
der their various schedules as “illicit traffic.”160 In one of the only treatments 
of the relationship between the international trade and drug control regimes, 
published over twenty years ago, Kal Raustiala observed possible tension 
between, on the one hand, the objective of freer trade reflected in provisions 
of international economic law and, on the other, the implied obligations in 
the UN drug regime to maintain strict customs measures to prevent drug 
smuggling and related practices such as money laundering. According to 
Raustiala:
reference the Consolidated Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which expressly refers to the 
GATT and the WTO).
156. Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
157. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
158. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Govern-
ance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 23 (2016).
159. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 
3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
160. The 1988 Convention is titled in full United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Resolution I to the Single Convention 
expresses “the hope that adequate resources will be made available to provide assistance in the 
fight against the illicit traffic.” 1988 Convention, supra note 5. Article 28 of the Single Con-
vention states that “[t]he Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the 
misuse of, and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the cannabis plant.” Single Convention, supra 
note 5, at art. 28. Article 35 of the Single Convention is titled “Action against the illicit traf-
fic.” Single Convention, supra note 5, at art 35; see also RICHARD LINES, DRUG CONTROL 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 108–125 (2017). 
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There are at least five ways in which economic liberalization facili-
tates drug trafficking. Liberalization lowers the prices of legal in-
puts in drug production. It improves the infrastructure of trade, 
lowering transport costs and expanding access and distribution for 
all goods. Liberalization increases the volume of goods in com-
merce, providing more hiding places for drugs. By so doing, it also 
overtaxes customs officials, thereby decreasing the time and effort 
available for drug interdiction. Finally, by facilitating money laun-
dering and legal investment, financial liberalization permits traf-
fickers to hide, clean, and enjoy their profits.161
Despite these tensions between the general policies of free trade (and 
their effects) and the policies of the UN drug regime, only fairly recently 
have there been rulings in the WTO dispute settlement system that address 
the relationship of international economic law norms to drugs and illicit 
trade. In the EC–Tariff Preferences case, India challenged the practice of 
the European Union in giving preferred market access to a subset of devel-
oping countries that were deemed to be addressing problems with traffick-
ing in or production of narcotic drugs.162 The EU participated in a WTO-
authorized scheme (the Generalized System of Preferences or “GSP”) to 
provide lower tariffs to developing countries in general. The question was 
whether measures in the war on drugs could be a justification for giving 
some of the countries in the scheme more favorable terms of market access 
to assist them, or incentivize them, to take measures against drug traffick-
ing.163
The EU argued that its practices were a reasonable means to facilitate 
“alternative development,” which encourages other means of economic ac-
tivity as alternatives to drug production.164 The EU claimed its measures 
were reasonable because, first, encouraging alternative economic activities 
was an important dimension of drug control policy acknowledged in the UN 
drug regime, and second, there was additional market access for alternative-
ly-created, licit products from the designated countries.165 Referring, inter 
alia, to the 1988 Convention, the WTO panel accepted that this could, in 
principle, be a basis for limiting the EU’s obligation under the GSP scheme 
not to discriminate between developing countries.166 But the departure from 
non-discrimination obligations was not justified, according to the panel, be-
cause “alternative development” could be encouraged by measures such as 
161. Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization & International Narcotics Trafficking, 32 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 89, 116 (1999).
162. Panel Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Pref-
erences to Developing Countries, ¶ 1.5, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2004).
163. Id. ¶¶ 2.2–8.
164. Id. ¶ 7.184.
165. Id.
166. Id. ¶¶ 7.204–06.
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financial and technical assistance that deviated less from the rules of the 
game for the GSP scheme.167
The Appellate Body decided the case against the EU on the more lim-
ited grounds that the EU scheme neither contained nor applied objective cri-
teria to determine which countries were eligible for special treatment on 
grounds of their efforts against drug trafficking.168 The Appellate Body 
found that an objective link or nexus is required between the preferential
treatment and the development needs of the developing countries being of-
fered that treatment.169 This was the first explicit encounter between the in-
ternational economic regime and the drug regime. And this encounter shows 
that, at least on first impression, the mere pursuit of objectives and policies 
under the auspices of the UN drug regime does not excuse deviation from 
WTO obligations.
The WTO more recently reinforced this logic in a dispute concerning 
anti-money laundering measures in Colombia.170 Colombia implemented a 
special approach to tariffs that deviated from normal WTO practice, justify-
ing the special approach as targeting artificially low-priced imports that ac-
tually concealed money laundering. The WTO Appellate Body held that the 
fact that Colombia’s government was addressing what Colombia considered 
to be “illicit trade” did not suspend the operation of WTO rules; instead, Co-
lombia would have to justify its anti-money laundering measures under a 
specific exception provision in the relevant WTO Agreement—in this case, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”).171
The implication of this ruling is that there is no general carve-out from 
WTO rules where trade is deemed “illicit.” Therefore, with recreational 
cannabis, the disciplines of the WTO treaties still apply to Canada’s law. 
There are also defined exceptions to these rules, however, that might justify 
certain aspects of Canada’s law that would otherwise run afoul of WTO dis-
ciplines. Accordingly, in the discussion below, we consider both the most 
relevant disciplines as well as any applicable exception and limitation claus-
es. As a general matter, legalizing a good domestically has important impli-
cations for a Member’s WTO obligations. As will be explained in the dis-
cussion that follows, the GATT, the main WTO treaty on trade in goods, 
generally does not allow Members of the WTO to ban imports or exports of 
167. Id. ¶¶ 7.220–22.
168. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶¶ 188–91, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R (adopt-
ed Apr. 7, 2004).
169. Id. ¶ 164; see also Robert Howse, Mainstreaming the Right to Development into the 
World Trade Organization, in REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN 
COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO 
DEVELOPMENT 249, 256 (2013).
170. Appellate Body Report, Colombia—Measures Relating to the Importation of Tex-
tiles, Apparel and Footwear, ¶¶ 6.1–3, WTO Doc. WT/DS461/AB/R (adopted June 22, 2016) 
[hereinafter Colombia–Textiles].
171. Id. ¶¶ 5.41–45.
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goods (Article XI). However, where a ban on imports and/or exports is an 
integral part of a scheme that also bans the production, distribution, and/or 
use of a product domestically, the ban may be permissible if it does not dis-
criminate against imports (Article III). In other words, the requirement is 
one of evenhandedness between the treatment of domestic products and that 
of imported like products. What this means is that Canada, having now le-
galized domestic recreational cannabis, is subject to scrutiny under WTO 
rules for its continued prohibition of imports of recreational cannabis, which 
may well be unjustifiable.
A. Banning Import and Export of Cannabis as a Product
As noted in the first Part of this Article, Canada’s scheme contains an 
absolute ban on the import and export of cannabis for recreational use. This 
ban enhances the arguments developed in Part II concerning the broad com-
patibility between Canada’s scheme and the central anti-trafficking goals of 
the UN drug control and anti-trafficking framework. Canada has sought to 
legalize recreational use through a scheme of government control and regu-
lation, while at the same time strictly preventing its legalization decision 
from exacerbating the phenomenon of drug trafficking in any way. The 
Regulations enacted pursuant to the Cannabis Act further reinforce this bal-
ance by prohibiting persons with a background in drug trafficking or orga-
nized crime from participating in the legal Canadian cannabis industry.172
In contrast to recreational cannabis, medical cannabis is imported and 
exported across international borders. Prior to its scheme for legal recrea-
tional cannabis, Canada actively participated in international trade of medi-
cal cannabis, especially as an exporter. There is international trade in medi-
cal cannabis, with Uruguay, for instance, planning to export medical 
cannabis to Canada, Chile, and Israel.173 As legalization of recreational can-
nabis in other jurisdictions progresses, there is every reason to believe that 
Canadian producers would want to exploit export opportunities for recrea-
172. “The Minister may, at any time, conduct checks that are necessary to determine 
whether an applicant for, or the holder of, a security clearance poses a risk to public health or 
public safety, including the risk of cannabis being diverted to an illicit market or activity. 
Such checks include (a) a check of the applicant’s or holder’s criminal record; and (b) a check 
of the relevant files of law enforcement agencies that relate to the applicant or holder, includ-
ing intelligence gathered for law enforcement purposes.” Cannabis Regulations, supra note 
10, § 52.
“Grant of security clearance (1) Before granting a security clearance, the Minister must, 
taking into account any licence conditions that he or she imposes under subsection 62(10) of 
the Act, determine that the applicant does not pose an unacceptable risk to public health or 
public safety, including the risk of cannabis being diverted to an illicit market or activity.” Id.
§ 53. The section goes on to provide an extensive list of factors that may be taken into account 
in making that determination. 
173. Patricia Rey Mallén, Uruguay To Export Marihuana To Canada, Chile, Israel For 
Medical Purposes, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2014, 5:46 AM), https://www.ibtimes.com/
uruguay-export-marihuana-canada-chile-israel-medical-purposes-1530930.
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tional in addition to medical cannabis. Conversely, Uruguay—and other 
countries as they liberalize their domestic markets—might well wish to pur-
sue opportunities to export recreational cannabis to Canada. These possibili-
ties are clearly precluded by the Cannabis Act, setting up a significant dif-
ference between the treatment of medical and recreational cannabis in 
Canada with respect to international trade.
Article XI of the GATT prohibits quantitative restrictions. It states:
No prohibitions or restriction other than duties, taxes or other 
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export 
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any 
contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory 
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for ex-
port of any product destined for the territory of any other contract-
ing party.174
That Canada’s cannabis scheme restricts the issuance of import and export 
licenses to cannabis used for medical purposes is a clear violation of Article 
XI, as it imposes quantitative restrictions—in the form of a ban on import 
and export licenses—on the importation and exportation of cannabis used 
for recreational purposes. A blanket ban on imports or exports where the 
product is legally available domestically is a clear violation of Article XI. 
As the panel stated in Brazil–Tyres, “[t]here is no ambiguity as to what 
‘prohibitions’ on importation means: Members shall not forbid the importa-
tion of any product of any other Member into their markets.”175 At the same 
time, a WTO Member State that banned both the import and the domestic 
production of cannabis would not be in violation of the WTO rules on quan-
titative restrictions. This is because its import ban would be regarded as an 
integral part of its domestic regime, provided that the ban is applied equally 
to domestic and imported products, thus falling under Article III(4) rather 
than Article XI of the GATT.176
174. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XI, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190 (1994) 
[hereinafter GATT].
175. Panel Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 7.11, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS332/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007). 
176. See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and As-
bestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 8.83-.100, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001). 
The unadopted Tuna–Dolphin GATT report is especially instructive for the purposes of the 
present case. In that case, the United States Marine Mammals Protection Act involved two 
measures. The first was a regulation governing the fishing practices of national tuna fisher-
men. Secondly, it also imposed an import ban on tuna or tuna-based products where the com-
mercial fishing techniques used had the incidental effect of killing or severely injuring a 
greater number of marine mammals than the norms set by the United States. The Panel Report 
stated in general terms that: “This suggests that Article III covers only measures affecting 
products as such. Furthermore, the text of the Note Ad Article III refers to a measure ‘which 
applies to an imported product and the like domestic product and is collected or enforced, in 
the case of the imported product, at the time or point of importation’. This suggests that this 
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B. Participation of State Enterprises in Canada’s Cannabis Scheme
As previously discussed, Canada’s cannabis scheme operates in accord-
ance with the practice of federalism in the country. Within the legal parame-
ters set by the federal Cannabis Act, the provinces determine the modalities 
for the distribution and sale of recreational cannabis within the boundaries 
of their province. As a general matter, Canada is responsible for measures of 
provincial governments complying with WTO rules. For example, provin-
cial practices with respect to government distribution and sale of alcoholic 
beverages have been a subject of dispute settlement dating back to the pre-
WTO days of the original GATT.177 A number of provinces either enacted 
laws or published regulatory plans that would involve participation of pro-
vincial monopolies or government enterprises in the distribution and sale of 
recreational cannabis. In British Columbia, for instance, similar rules will be 
applied as currently exist for regulating liquor, with the British Columbia 
Liquor Distribution Branch acting as the wholesale distributor of recreation-
al cannabis.178 In Québec, only the Société québécoise du cannabis (the 
“SQDC”) is authorized for the retail sale of cannabis. 179
Note covers only measures applied to imported products that are of the same nature as those 
applied to the domestic products, such as a prohibition on importation of a product which en-
forces at the border an internal sales prohibition applied to both imported and like domestic 
products.” Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 5.11, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS21/R-39S/155.
Even more nuanced licensing regimes, like that in China-Raw Materials, have been 
found impermissible, with the panel in that case stating that “if a licensing system is designed 
such that a licensing agency has discretion to grant or deny a licence based on unspecified 
criteria, this would not meet the test we set out above in order to be permissible under Article 
XI:1.” Panel Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials,
¶ 7.921, WTO Doc. WT/DS398/R (adopted Feb. 22, 2012). Similarly, in US-Shrimp, a ban on 
importing certain shrimp on the basis of the method by which the shrimp were harvested was 
found to be in violation of Article XI. Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibitions of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 7.16, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (adopted Nov. 6, 
1998). In both of these cases, as well as in Brazil-Tyres, the quantitative restrictions were 
more limited than the total import/export ban in the Cannabis Act. In light of the prohibition 
on quantitative restrictions, it would theoretically be less problematic for a country to legalize 
domestic cannabis cultivation exclusively for export while maintaining a legal regime that 
criminalized domestic cannabis consumption.
177. See, e.g., Panel Report, Canada–Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic 
Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, DS17/R GATT BISD (39th Supp.), at 27 (1992) 
[hereinafter Canada–Alcohol].
178. Cannabis, B.C., https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/safety/public-safety/cannabis
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019) (in British Columbia, the British Columbia Liquor Distribution 
Branch (LDB) “will operate the public retail stores, and Liquor Control and Regulations 
Branch (LCRB) will be responsible for licensing private stores and monitoring the retail sec-
tor.”). 
179. The Legislation on Cannabis in Brief, QUÈBEC,
https://encadrementcannabis.gouv.qc.ca/en/loi/cadre-legal-en-bref/ (last visited Mar. 10, 
2019). 
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The GATT permits the operation of monopolies and state trading enter-
prises subject to the requirement in Article XVII that they make purchases 
and sales on a commercial basis and observe the non-discrimination norms 
of the GATT in their operations.180 As the Appellate Body in Canada–
Wheat Board held, the references to general non-discriminatory treatment in 
Article XVII:1 prohibit WTO Member States from using state trading enter-
prises as a means of discriminating “in ways that would be prohibited if un-
dertaken directly by Members.”181 Given that the federal import/export ban 
just discussed makes it legally impossible for provincial state enterprises 
and monopolies to consider imports for their purchases of cannabis or to 
contemplate export opportunities, Article XVII may be largely moot as far 
as provincial government activity in the cannabis market is concerned. 
However, an issue may arise where domestically-grown cannabis neverthe-
less contains inputs from abroad such as bioengineering, know-how with 
respect to growing, or chemicals or processes designed to enhance the prod-
uct. In such instances, Article XVII would preclude a provincial government 
enterprise or monopoly from discriminating against domestically produced 
cannabis on the basis of foreign inputs in the product. Such inputs are not as 
such covered by the recreational import ban.182 An important jurisprudential 
question is whether such inputs would be regarded as traded “services” ra-
ther than content of goods. We will return to this issue below when we con-
sider Canada’s commitments under the WTO General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (the “GATS”).
Article XVII is rarely invoked in WTO jurisprudence but is addressed 
in several GATT-era panel reports. In the Korea–Beef GATT panel report, 
the panel clarified that state-granted exclusive import monopolies were legal 
but they would still need to conform to other GATT requirements, including 
Article XI’s prohibition on quantitative restrictions.183 In other words, being 
a state-trading enterprise does not excuse such parties from treating domes-
tic economic actors and economic actors of other WTO Members in an ev-
enhanded fashion.
180. GATT, supra note 174, art. XVII, ¶ 1(a)–(b); see Steve McCorriston & Donald 
MacLaren, State Trading, the WTO and GATT Article XVII, 25 WORLD ECON. 107, 109–10
(2002).
181. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and 
Treatment of Imported Grain, ¶ 98, WTO Doc. WT/DS276/AB/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2004). 
This position was later reiterated by the panel body. Panel Report, Canada—Certain 
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, ¶ 7.143, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS412/R (adopted May 24, 2013).
182. Subsection 62(2) of the Cannabis Act states that “Licences and permits authorizing 
the importation or exportation of cannabis may be issued only in respect of cannabis for medi-
cal or scientific purposes or in respect of industrial hemp.” Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 
62(2) (Can.). 
183. Report of the Panel, Republic of Korea–Restrictions on Imports of Beef, ¶¶ 114–15, 
L/6503 GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 268 (1989).
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Most relevant for our purposes are the two GATT panels concerning 
Canada’s provincial liquor monopolies. The first GATT panel resulted from 
a complaint by the European Communities that the provincial liquor mo-
nopolies were discriminating against European alcohol through a combina-
tion of discriminatory markups on imported alcohol as well as through un-
favorable access to retail markets.184 Canada argued that Article XVII:1(b) 
exempted state trading enterprises from having to strictly follow the national 
treatment and non-discrimination requirements of Article III:4. Neverthe-
less, the panel found a violation of Canada’s GATT obligations. It stated 
that it “saw great force in the argument that Article III:4 was also applicable 
to state-trading enterprises at least when the monopoly of the importation 
and monopoly of the distribution in the domestic markets were com-
bined[,]” as was the case here.185 The second GATT panel relating to the 
Canadian provincial liquor monopolies was a result of a complaint brought 
by the United States concerning the importation of beer.186 At issue was 
Canada’s implementation of the ruling against it in the earlier EC GATT 
case; the United States argued that Canada failed to implement the ruling, 
continuing to subject beer to discriminatory practices. Here again, the panel 
found that Canada could not justify its actions under Article XVII.187
In order to operate a state trading enterprise, the country must inform 
the other WTO Member States of the products that are imported into or ex-
ported from the country by such state trading enterprises.188 Article XVII 
takes a broad view of state trading enterprises, including not only enterpris-
es that are state-owned or state-controlled by definition but also enterprises 
that are granted “exclusive or special privileges” by the state.189 This latter 
category appears to include private enterprises that operate on the basis of 
licenses granted by the state, as would be the case with the recreational can-
nabis industry in some Canadian provinces.190 Ontario is one such exam-
ple.191
184. Report of the Panel, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drink by Canadian Provin-
cial Marketing Agencies, ¶ 3.1, L/6304 GATT BISD (35th Supp.), at 37 (1988) [hereinafter 
Canada–Alcohol (1988, GATT)].
185. Id. ¶¶ 3.34, 4.26.
186. See Canada–Alcohol, supra note 177, ¶¶ 4.3, 4.7.
187. Id. ¶ 5.15.
188. GATT, supra note 174, art. XVII, ¶ 4.
189. Id. art. XVII, ¶ 1(a). 
190. Adam Jones, Ontario Moves to Allow Private Cannabis Retailers, MKT. REALIST
(Sept, 27, 2018), https://marketrealist.com/2018/09/ontario-moves-to-allow-private-cannabis-
retailers. See generally Robert Howse, State Trading Enterprises and Multilateral Trade 
Rules: The Canadian Experience, in STATE TRADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 181 
(Thomas Cottier et al. eds. 1998).
191. Jones, supra note 190.
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C. Potential Justifications Under the GATT for 
Canada’s Import/Export Ban on Recreational Cannabis
Article XX is the general exception provision of the GATT and allows 
for an affirmative defense to violations of the principal GATT obligations. 
Some parties have successfully used it as a justification for quantitative re-
strictions in a number of situations, including in EC–Asbestos and US–
Shrimp (21.5).192 A successful Article XX defense requires two steps: first, 
demonstrating that the measure in question falls under one of the specific 
enumerated exceptions in Article XX; and second, proving that the measure 
is consistent with the chapeau of Article XX.193
Differentiating between recreational and medical cannabis in a legal re-
gime wherein only medical cannabis is legal poses no real trade law issues. 
Article XX of the GATT offers countries that have only legalized medical 
cannabis three main avenues to justify the exclusion of the importation of 
recreational cannabis: under Article XX(a) as being necessary for the pro-
tection of public morals; under Article XX(b) on the basis that the ban is 
necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; or under Article 
XX(d) on the basis that the ban is necessary “to secure compliance with 
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement,” in particular the international drug conventions.194
As long as there is no legal recreational cannabis, quantitative re-
strictions on the importation of cannabis for non-medical purposes seem jus-
tifiable, even though the products are arguably identical. Indeed, as dis-
cussed above, under the GATT, a complete ban on importation and/or 
exportation of non-medical cannabis might be regarded as a measure to be 
considered under Article III:4 of the GATT, not Article XI, where such a 
ban operates in tandem with the prohibition of domestic marketing and sale 
of non-medical cannabis.
Canada has, however, legalized recreational cannabis while banning 
any importation or exportation of such product. While the same possible 
justifications for the ban could be used as would exist in a situation where 
recreational cannabis were illegal (justified through Article XX(a) and the 
protection of public morals, Article XX(b) and the protection of human life 
or health, or Article XX(d) and compliance with laws or regulations), such a 
defense is unlikely to succeed in a legal regime that approves recreational 
use of domestically grown cannabis.
192. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001); Appel-
late Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted 
Nov. 21, 2001). 
193. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, at 22, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter 
US–Gasoline].
194. GATT, supra note 174, art. XX(a), (b), (d). 
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Where domestically illegal, recreational cannabis would likely be 
viewed as against public morals. WTO jurisprudence has made it clear that 
panels are generally unwilling to look too closely into Article XX(a) (or the 
analogous Article XIV(a) of the GATS) justifications, leaving considerable 
leeway for Members to determine for themselves what issues impact public 
morals.195 What constitutes a matter of public morals is strongly intertwined 
with questions of national sovereignty. Judgment by international panelists 
on whether a ban on certain types of publications (as was the case in China–
AV), for instance, in fact constituted a genuine ground for a public moral 
exception would likely be viewed as unduly invasive.196 In a case where rec-
reational use of cannabis is legalized, however, an argument for imposing 
an import/export ban on the basis of public morals would not survive even 
the minimal scrutiny that a WTO panel would exercise. There is no moral 
difference between the consumption of domestic and imported recreational 
cannabis where such recreational cannabis is produced in a similarly legal 
environment in both the domestic market and the other WTO Members’ 
markets and where there is little or no concern that illicit criminal gangs are 
influencing the production. As such, there cannot reasonably be an argu-
ment justifying a complete ban on importation and exportation of recrea-
tional cannabis on the basis of public morals.
Unlike Article XX(a), Article XX(b) presents a more viable justification 
for an import/export ban. Under Article XX(b), it may be argued that recrea-
tional cannabis is an intoxicant and that there may be long-term health con-
sequences from recreational use and, therefore, an import/export ban is jus-
tified in the interest of protecting human life and health. In a situation where 
domestic recreational cannabis is illegal, this would likely justify a complete 
import/export ban.
However, the domestic legalization of recreational cannabis undermines 
most arguments in favor of this position; if the health consequences were so 
significant, a less trade disruptive alternative would be to continue to pro-
hibit all recreational cannabis possession, cultivation, distribution, and con-
sumption. One possible justification relates to the relatively unregulated na-
195. See, e.g., Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribu-
tion Services for Certain Publications And Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS363/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010) [hereinafter China–AV], ¶ 7.759; Panel Report, Euro-
pean Communities–Measures Prohibiting The Importation And Marketing of Seal Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R (adopted June 18, 2014), ¶ 7.630–39; Panel Report,
United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Ser-
vices, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/RW (adopted Apr. 20, 2005), ¶ 6.457–74. 
196. In China–AV, China argued that certain reading materials and AV products consti-
tuted “cultural goods” that might have a negative impact on public morals. China–AV, supra
note 195, ¶ 7.751. The United States, who was challenging the measures, significantly did not 
argue that the measures were not measures to protect public morals, but rather that the means 
chosen by China were not necessary. Id. ¶ 7.756. The panel cited the panel in US–Gambling,
which found in relation to Article XIV(a) of the GATS that Members should be allowed def-
erence to define what constitute public morals to them. Id. ¶ 7.759. 
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ture of the international cannabis trade. Even in countries where recreational 
cannabis is legal, regulations concerning THC levels, as well as the addi-
tives that may be used in the product, may not be as clear as in the proposed 
Canadian legislation. In such an environment, it could be argued that an im-
port ban is justified to protect recreational cannabis users from exposure to 
poorly regulated cannabis from other countries. This is because Article 
XX(b) permits WTO Members to determine the level of risk they are will-
ing to accept in relation to the protection of human, animal, or plant life or 
health.
The ban on the issuance of licenses for the exportation of recreational 
cannabis, however, would not be justifiable under this rationale, as the draft 
Canadian regulation envisions clear labeling requirements for THC content 
and other aspects of the cannabis product. Additionally, this argument 
would have less force where the producers of imported products were able 
and willing to satisfy Canadian regulatory standards and to abide by any 
laws and regulations to ensure that Canada’s health and related public poli-
cy goals are met.
Article XX(d) provides an exception for measures that are “necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent” with 
the provisions of the GATT.197 Arguably, the international drug conventions 
prohibit Canada from importing or exporting cannabis for recreational pur-
poses, as will be discussed in a later section. In light of this, Canada could 
possibly argue that the blanket import/export bans on recreational cannabis 
are justified by Article XX(d) since the treaties constitute laws or regula-
tions that are not inconsistent with the GATT.
Much of the WTO jurisprudence relating to Article XX(d) focuses on 
compliance with domestic laws and regulations that are consistent with the 
GATT.198 The question of whether international treaties can constitute laws 
or regulations in the context of Article XX(d) has been less thoroughly ex-
amined, although two decisions provide some insight on this point: Mexico–
Soft Drinks and India–Solar Cells. While Mexico–Soft Drinks looked at 
NAFTA in the context of interstate obligations, India–Solar Cells focused 
on the relationship between international treaties and domestic law.
In Mexico–Soft Drinks, Mexico argued that the NAFTA constituted a 
law or regulation as specified in Article XX(d) and that its measures were 
“necessary to secure compliance” by the United States with its obligations 
under the NAFTA.199 The panel disagreed, finding that compliance relates to 
the relationship between the state and its subjects rather than interstate rela-
tions; there is no concept of private action against a state that would justify a 
197. GATT, supra note 174, art. XX(d).
198. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶¶ 152–158, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R 
(adopted Jan. 10, 2001); Colombia–Textiles, supra note 170, ¶¶ 5.137–53.
199. Panel Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 
8.162, WTO Doc. WT/DS308/R (adopted Mar. 24, 2006).
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countermeasure such as the one in question under the guise of enforce-
ment.200 As such, the panel held that Article XX(d) was intended to address 
“action at a domestic rather than international level.”201 The Appellate Body
upheld the panel’s findings, holding that Article XX(d) relates to “rules that 
form part of the domestic legal system” of a WTO Member State (that is, 
those that have direct effect).202
In the case of compliance with the international drug conventions, how-
ever, the obligations vis-à-vis criminalization of cannabis extend from the 
international treaties into domestic law. The recent India–Solar Cells dis-
pute provides some clarification of how this might work in practice. The 
cumulative requirements of Article XX(d) are that there must be laws or 
regulations, that these must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the 
GATT, and that the measures in question are meant to secure compliance 
with those laws and regulations.203 India here argued that the international 
conventions (in particular, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) that it was invoking had direct effect on the domestic Indi-
an legal system and thus were laws or regulations under Article XX(d).204
The panel disagreed, finding that implementing legislation was necessary 
for international law obligations to take effect under Indian law.205 The Ap-
pellate Body further clarified that a determination of whether an internation-
al instrument
operates with a sufficient degree of normativity and specificity un-
der the domestic legal system of a Member so as to set out a rule of 
conduct or course of action, and thereby qualify as a ‘law or regula-
tion’, must be carried out on case-by-case basis, taking into account 
all the other relevant factors relating to the instrument and the do-
mestic legal system of the Member.206
The difficulty here for Canada is the test “sufficient degree of norma-
tivity and specificity under the domestic legal system of a Member so as to 
set out a rule of conduct or course of action.” As discussed at length in the 
previous sections of this Article, Canada, in legalizing recreational cannabis, 
has modified some of the main obligations of the UN conventions to re-
spond to its own legal imperatives. As argued above, this modification may 
be a permissible accommodation under the 1988 Convention. Nevertheless, 
200. Id. ¶ 8.178.
201. Id. ¶ 8.179. 
202. Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Bever-
ages, ¶ 70, WTO Doc. WT/DS308/AB/R (adopted Mar. 24, 2006).
203. Panel Report, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules,
¶ 7.267, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016).
204. Id. ¶ 7.295–96.
205. Id. ¶ 7.298.
206. Appellate Body Report, India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules, ¶ 5.141, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (adopted Oct. 14, 2016).
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Canada has fallen short of simply translating the conventions into rules of 
conduct in domestic law.
For a measure to be justifiable under Article XX(a), (b), or (d), it must 
not only meet the criteria of the subsection but must also be necessary. In 
Colombia-Textiles, the Appellate Body stated that the “necessity analysis 
involves a process of ‘weighing and balancing’ a series of factors, including 
the importance of the societal interest or value at stake, the contribution of 
the measure to the objective it pursues, and the trade-restrictiveness of the 
measure.”207 In the context of the Canadian import ban, a blanket im-
port/export ban on recreational cannabis would seem to be more trade re-
strictive than necessary to address potential concerns with protecting human 
life or health. Less trade restrictive alternatives could include clear labeling 
requirements on imported products that would be comparable to Canadian 
labeling regulations.
Even where a panel finds that a measure falls under one of the subsec-
tions of Article XX, however, it must still meet the requirements of the cha-
peau, or preambular paragraph, of Article XX. The chapeau requires the 
country invoking Article XX as an affirmative defense to show that the 
measure is applied in a non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary way and that it 
does not operate as a disguised restriction on international trade.208 As laid 
out by the Appellate Body in US–Shrimp, there are three requirements that 
must be met for a measure to constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation”: (1) application of the measure must result in discrimination; (2) 
discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character; and (3) dis-
crimination must occur between countries where the same conditions pre-
vail.209
The import/export ban in the Cannabis Act is unlikely to meet the re-
quirements of the chapeau. Since the act permits licensed individuals and 
entities to produce and sell recreational cannabis, a ban on imports of recre-
ational cannabis results in discrimination against foreign producers in favor 
of Canadian producers.210 This is arbitrary and unjustifiable in nature since 
there is no justification for treating foreign producers of recreational canna-
bis differently than domestic ones, particularly where importation of medi-
cal cannabis is permitted under the Act. Central to the arbitrary and unjusti-
fiable analysis is whether the policy is rationally related to the policy 
207. Colombia–Textiles, supra note 170, ¶ 5.102.
208. GATT Article XX’s chapeau reads: “Subject to the requirement that such measures 
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures . . . .” GATT, supra note 174, art. XX.
209. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 150, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998).
210. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 175–76.
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objectives used to justify the measure.211 One of the policy objectives of the 
Canadian act is to decrease illegal trade in cannabis.212 Banning legal im-
ports of recreational cannabis would appear to be contrary to this aim. Re-
ports suggesting that legalization of cannabis in Canada could in fact result 
in a temporary shortage of legal domestically grown cannabis raise concerns 
that the illicit trade in cannabis will continue.213 If this were indeed the case, 
then the import ban on recreational cannabis would seem to particularly 
counteract the stated goal of the Act in reducing illicit trading in cannabis, 
supporting the argument that this is unjustifiable.
On the basis of this analysis, it is unlikely that an affirmative defense 
based on Article XX to a challenge against Canada regarding the im-
port/export ban on recreational cannabis would withstand scrutiny, particu-
larly since the burden of proving that the measure is not arbitrary and unjus-
tified is on the country invoking the Article XX defense.214 Here, it is 
helpful to consider how the WTO Appellate Body considered a GATS Arti-
cle XIV defense that the United States mounted in order to justify prohibi-
tions on Internet gaming. At issue in the US–Gambling case were provisions 
of the GATS that closely parallel those of Article XI of the GATT.215 The 
Appellate Body was prepared to accept that there were distinctive moral ar-
guments for singling out Internet gambling as opposed to gaming as such 
(easier for young people to avoid age restrictions, money laundering risks, 
etc.). Nevertheless, it still found a violation of the chapeau in the one in-
stance where the restriction (the Interstate Horseracing Act) clearly allowed 
provision of the gambling services in question by domestic U.S. economic 
actors.216 It was not clear that the Interstate Horseracing Act would allow the 
provision of Internet gambling services by other WTO Members, specifical-
ly those of the complainant, Antigua. Thus, the Appellate Body came to a 
conclusion of unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau.217
211. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Impor-
tation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.306, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R; 
WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014). 
212. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 7(c) (Can.).
213. Dianne Buckner, Don’t Delete Your Dealer’s Number Yet–Legal Cannabis Short-
age Looms, CBC (Oct. 3, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/legal-cannabis-
shortage-looms-1.4845816 (noting that estimates suggest that Canadian producers will only be 
able to supply one third of customer demand in the first year, giving rise to concerns that ille-
gal trade in cannabis will continue).
214. US–Gasoline, supra note 193, at 22–23.
215. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Sup-
ply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 216, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 
2005) [hereinafter US–Gambling].
216. Id. ¶ 368.
217. Id. ¶ 369.
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D. The TBT Agreement and International Standards
In addition to the GATT, the WTO encompasses two other specialized 
agreements that address regulations and standards affecting trade in goods: 
the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (the “TBT”) and the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (the “SPS”), the latter concerning 
measures that relate to the health and safety of food and agricultural prod-
ucts. With the exception of “edibles,” where cannabis could be regarded as a 
“toxin” in food, Canada’s ban on trade in cannabis appears to fall outside 
the definition of a measure covered by the SPS Agreement.218
Because Canada has taken a prohibitive approach, simply excluding 
importation and exportation of recreational cannabis, the analysis under 
TBT would not be much different than under the GATT, focusing on justifi-
cation for this highest degree of trade restrictiveness. One important differ-
ence, however, is that the TBT Agreement provides for a presumption of 
legality in the case of regulations that conform to or that are in accord with 
international standards.219 For example, while the TBT Agreement requires 
that regulations not constitute “an unnecessary obstacle to trade” (that is, not 
be more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate objective, 
such as health),220 Article 2.5 provides in relevant part: “Whenever a tech-
nical regulation is prepared, adopted or applied for one of the legitimate ob-
jectives explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2, and is in accordance with rele-
vant international standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade.”221 Since the UN drug conven-
tions clearly require a prohibitive approach to the trade of recreational can-
nabis as a product, the question arises as to whether they would be consid-
ered “international standards” under the TBT Agreement. If so, this would 
go a long way toward justifying Canada’s trade ban on recreational cannabis 
under the standard in Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement.
218. The definition is as follows: ‘1. Sanitary or phytosanitary measure - Any measure 
applied: (a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organ-
isms or disease-causing organisms; (b) to protect human or animal life or health within the 
territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; (c) to protect human life or health within 
the territory of the Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or 
products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or (d) to prevent or limit 
other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, establishment or spread of 
pests.” Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Annex A 1, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 493. 
219. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [here-
inafter TBT Agreement].
220. Id. art. 2.2.
221. Id. art. 2.5.
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In the case of the TBT Agreement, the meaning of “international stand-
ards” was recently addressed in the Australia–Plain Packaging dispute, 
where Australia’s labeling and packaging requirements for cigarettes were 
challenged both under the TBT Agreement and the WTO Agreement on 
Trade and Intellectual Property (the “TRIPS”).222 In that case, the WTO 
panel rejected Australia’s argument that guidelines to implementation of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control constituted “international 
standards” within the meaning of Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement.223 The 
panel applied criteria for determining the meaning of international standard-
ization under TBT that was developed by the TBT Committee in the WTO. 
The Appellate Body adopted these criteria as an appropriate legal approach 
in the US–Tuna II dispute, including the standards as those of a “recognized 
body.”224 The panel also placed considerable emphasis on the definition of a 
standard in general in Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement; a standard, accord-
ing to this provision, is a document “that provides rules, guidelines or char-
acteristics for products or related processes and production methods.”225
However, another dimension of the definition of a standard in Annex 
1.2 of the TBT Agreement is that it be “not mandatory.”226 This is at odds 
with the nature of the obligations in the UN drug conventions with respect 
to trafficking or trade in scheduled drugs, which are, as discussed in an ear-
lier section of this Article, regarded as the most unconditional legal re-
quirements of the Conventions and permit almost no flexibility. That being 
said, it is far from clear that the definition of a standard in Annex 1.2 of the 
TBT Agreement is the appropriate benchmark for applying the notion of in-
ternational standards as justificatory under Article 2.5 of the TBT Agree-
ment. This is an issue that goes beyond the scope of analysis of this Article. 
However, it seems that, even if the general definition is useful in addressing 
standards of a kind often used by private economic actors in the production 
of products, it would be perverse to allow states a justification for their 
measures in the case of non-mandatory international guidelines while not 
allowing them a justification where international norms are fully binding, as 
in the UN drug conventions. On the other hand, Canada’s cannabis scheme, 
as previously discussed, has been branded as a deviation from the UN drug 
conventions in its legalization of possession and use of recreational canna-
bis. This would raise the issue of whether the scheme is fully in accordance 
222. Australia–Plain Packaging, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1.1, 7.17.
223. Id. ¶¶ 7.326–30. 
224. Id. ¶¶ 7.278, 7.330ff.
225. Id. ¶¶ 7.335–40.
226. TBT Agreement, supra note 219, Annex I. The definition of standard is: “Docu-
ment approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with 
which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, 
symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method.”
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with the drug conventions and whether full compliance would be required 
for the UN drug conventions to be invoked as “international standards” 
within the meaning of Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement. Without guidance 
from the WTO Appellate Body, it is unclear how this issue might be re-
solved.
E. Cannabis Legalization and the Trade In Services
A major achievement of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade nego-
tiations that created the WTO was the extension of basic norms such as pro-
hibition of quantitative restrictions and non-discrimination against imports 
(National Treatment) to trade through a new agreement, the GATS.227 In 
the GATS, the obligations on quantitative restrictions and National Treat-
ment (Articles XVI and XII respectively) apply only to those services sec-
tors or sub-sectors of services activity that are specified by individual WTO 
Members. The GATS also contains provisions on monopolies and state en-
terprises (Article VIII) and on licensing and professional qualifications (Ar-
ticle VI). Finally, the GATS has a general public policy exception (Article 
XIV) that includes an exception for public morals and public order.228
It is clear that the UN drug conventions view “international trade” as 
the movement of a scheduled drug itself across international borders.229 If 
one is to analyze cannabis in contemporary supply chain230 or value chain231
227. See The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage 
and Disciplines, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_
e.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2019).
228. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1994) [hereinafter 
GATS]. Article XIV reads as follows: “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in ser-
vices, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any Member of measures: (a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order.”
Id.
229. See, for example, Article 30 of the Single Convention, which is titled “Trade and 
Distribution” and exclusively addresses “trade in and distribution of drugs.” Single Conven-
tion, supra note 5, art. 30, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
230. “A supply chain consists of all stages involved, directly or indirectly, in fulfilling a 
consumer’s request. The supply chain not only includes the manufacturers and suppliers, but 
also transporters, warehouses, retailers and customers themselves.” Martin Hart et al., Con-
temporary Supply Chain Trends and World’s Freight Traffic, in DEVELOPING OF 
TRANSPORTATION FLOWS IN 21ST CENTURY SUPPLY CHAINS 99, 101, 
https://www.ue.katowice.pl/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/7_M.Hart_X.Lukoszova_
J.Rasner_Contemporary....pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
231. “A ‘supply chain’ refers to the system and resources required to move a product or 
service from supplier to customer. The ‘value chain’ concept builds on this to also consider 
the manner in which value is added along the chain, both to the product / service and the ac-
tors involved. From a sustainability perspective, ‘value chain’ has more appeal, since it explic-
itly references internal and external stakeholders in the value-creation process. See What Is a 
Value Chain? Definitions and Characteristics, CAMBRIDGE INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
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terms, a significant contribution to the final product comes from services 
inputs such as research, testing, and agricultural consulting. Cannabis can be 
grown almost anywhere.232 The UN drug conventions do not really reflect 
these kinds of realities and generally assume that what is trafficked is the 
drug as a final product or as component products, failing to account for the 
service aspect of cannabis production. In the case of medical cannabis, firms 
have already circumvented export restrictions by selling know-how through 
licenses to jurisdictions where the growing and production of medical can-
nabis products is legal, for instance—the Israeli firm Tikun Olam is a case 
in point.233 The UN drug conventions do not call for criminalization of such 
activities unless (arguably) they are ancillary to illicit distribution and traf-
ficking of the scheduled drug. The Single Convention does require that 
states parties control “all persons and enterprises carrying on or engaged in 
the manufacture of drugs.”234 It would, however, be a very broad interpreta-
tion of that provision to find that any provider of ancillary services, such as 
biotechnology or agronomy, is engaged in actual manufacturing. Neverthe-
less, Canada’s scheme contemplates that such persons be licensed and, in a 
number of cases, have security clearances as well, as we shall discuss be-
low.235
As discussed in the first Part of this Article, Canada’s scheme leaves the 
market structure for the production, distribution, and sale of cannabis to the 
provinces within the general parameters of the federal Cannabis Act. In its 
schedule of commitments in the GATS, Canada accepted the obligations of 
the GATS on Market Access (Article XVI) and National Treatment (Article 
XVII) for wholesaling, distribution, and retailing services.236 These are, gen-
LEADERSHIP, https://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/graduate-study/pgcerts/value-chain-defs (last visited 
Mar. 11, 2019). 
232. See WORLD WIDE WEED: GLOBAL TRENDS IN CANNABIS CULTIVATION AND ITS 
CONTROL (Tom DeCorte et al. eds., 2011); Daniel Heilmann, The International Control of 
Illegal Drugs and the U.N. Treaty Regime: Preventing or Causing Human Rights Violations?,
19 CARDOZO J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 237, 260 (2010).
233. TikunOlam and MedReleaf, TIKUNOLAM, https://www.tikunolam.com/
article.php?id=1112 (last visited Mar. 12, 2019); see also Kris Krane, Cannabis Cultivation 
Will Be a Race to the Bottom, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2018, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kriskrane/2018/04/25/cannabis-cultivation-will-be-a-race-to-the-
bottom/.
234. Single Convention, supra note 5, art. 29, ¶ 2(a).
235. Article 9 of Bill C-45 establishes the parameters for distribution. Cannabis Act, 
S.C. 2018, c 16, § 9 (Can.). Article 50 of the Regulations to Support Coming into Force of the 
Cannabis Act details the individuals who must hold a security clearance. Cannabis Regula-
tions, supra note 10, § 50.
236. GATS, supra note 228, Canada Schedule of Specific Commitments. Under the 
GATS, WTO Member States are free to negotiate which services sectors they wish to open to 
foreign participants. Unlike in the GATT, where all of the obligations apply to all goods from 
all the Member States, the WTO recognizes that services include more sensitive sectors that 
countries may be reluctant to liberalize. As such, the schedules produced by each Member
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erally speaking, analogous to the GATT obligations in Article XI (Quantita-
tive Restrictions) and Article III (National Treatment) discussed above.
Canada’s GATS commitments are subject to some limitations and ex-
ceptions. Canada has largely or entirely excluded tobacco, alcohol, and 
pharmaceuticals from its commitments. Obviously, when Canada formulat-
ed its schedule in the mid-1990s, a legal market in recreational cannabis was 
not contemplated. The WTO Appellate Body has interpreted commitments 
scheduled by WTO Members very broadly. In the US–Gambling dispute, 
for example, the Appellate Body held that gambling came under the United 
States’ commitments with respect to entertainment services, even though 
gambling was illegal or highly controlled at both the federal and state levels 
when these commitments were made.237 Canada’s commitments on whole-
saling, distribution, and retailing include delivery of these services through 
the establishment of a commercial presence.238
Under Article 62(7)(e)(iii) of the Cannabis Act, the Minister of Justice 
may deny a permit or license on the sole grounds that the applicant is “an 
organization that was incorporated, formed or otherwise organized outside 
of Canada.”239 This seems a clear violation of Canada’s obligation of Na-
tional Treatment in the GATS. Moreover, the mere fact of a service provider 
being the national of another WTO Member would not lead to a viable basis 
for a public morals justification or, indeed, a health justification under the 
Article XIV exception. This is clear from the manner in which the Appellate 
Body applied the non-discrimination requirement in the chapeau of Article 
XIV in the US–Gambling case: to the extent that some exceptions to the ban 
on internet gambling applied to certain U.S. service providers (horseracing) 
but not to the complainant, Antigua, the U.S. measure was discriminatory in 
a manner that could not be justified under an Article XIV exception.240 Any 
such attempted justification would be further undermined because Article 
62(7)(a) of the Cannabis Act allows the Minister to refuse a license on the 
grounds of “risk to public health or public safety.” If legitimate public 
health or public safety concerns were at issue, a license or permit could be 
denied on the basis of this provision, making the grounds of foreign nation-
ality entirely unnecessary to protect public health and public safety.
The operation of Canada’s GATS commitments in cases where the 
provinces have established or will establish a government monopoly on 
State contain their commitments and indicate to what extent and in which sectors those coun-
tries are willing to liberalize their trade.
237. US–Gambling, supra note 215, ¶ 180.
238. All four modes of supply are covered in Canada’s schedule for the services in ques-
tion. These are 1) cross-border supply; 2) consumption abroad; 3) commercial presence; and 
4) presence of natural persons. The GATS permits WTO Members to choose, the modes to 
which its commitments apply for each sector or sub-sector. GATS, supra note 228, art. 1, Ca-
nadian Schedule of Specific Commitments.
239. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 62(7)(e)(iii).
240. US–Gambling, supra note 215, ¶ 369.
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wholesaling, distribution, and/or retailing are also affected by Article VIII 
of the GATS, which deals with monopolies and exclusive service providers. 
Article VIII:1 reads: “Each Member shall ensure that any monopoly suppli-
er of a service in its territory does not, in the supply of the monopoly service 
in the relevant market, act in a manner inconsistent with that Member’s ob-
ligations under Article II and specific commitments.”241 Article VIII:4 pro-
vides that the establishment of any new monopolies subsequent to the entry 
into force of the GATS shall be communicated to “the Council for Trade in 
Services no later than three months before the intended implementation of 
the grant of monopoly rights.”242 These provisions suppose that existing but 
also new monopolies are permitted under the GATS, provided that the mo-
nopoly respects GATS provisions in its operations. This means that, where
the monopoly obtains services such as testing or research and development, 
it must conform to the obligations of the GATS with respect to quantitative 
restrictions and national treatment. Since licenses and permits are generally 
required for the performance of such functions, the possibility that federal 
licenses and permits may be denied simply on the basis that an economic 
entity is established outside of Canada or because an individual “is not 
normally a resident of Canada” would be inconsistent with the obligations 
of any provincial monopoly under Article VIII of the GATS.243
The GATS further provides, in Article VI:4, that (subject to future 
negotiations on more specific disciplines) licensing and qualification 
requirements must be: “(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such 
as competence and the ability to supply the service; (b) not more burden-
some than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; [and] (c) in the 
case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of 
the service.”244 Licensing and qualification requirements under Canada’s 
cannabis scheme, as reflected in the Cannabis Act and the Regulations, may 
be in some tension with the provisions in GATS Article VI:4. The case of 
possible denial of a license based on non-Canadian nationality alone is an 
obvious one where scrutiny under Article VI:4 would be triggered. In the 
case of analytical testing, the Regulations stipulate as a requirement for a 
testing license that the head of a laboratory “possess a degree in a science 
related to the work to be carried out that is awarded by a Canadian universi-
ty or, if awarded by a foreign university, that is recognized by a Canadian 
university or a Canadian professional association.”245 This would create an 
241. GATS, supra note 228, art. VIII:1.
242. Id. art. VIII:4.
243. Id. arts. II:1, VIII:1.
244. Id. art. VI:4.
245. § 23(2) of the Regulations states that, “The head of laboratory must have sufficient 
knowledge of the provisions of the Act and these Regulations that apply to the holder of the 
licence for analytical testing, have knowledge and experience related to the duties of the posi-
tion and possess a degree in a science related to the work to be carried out that is awarded by a 
Canadian university or, if awarded by a foreign university, that is recognized by a Canadian 
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additional burden for some testing service suppliers from other WTO Mem-
bers. A real question arises, then, as to whether such a condition is “more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service.”246 With re-
spect to research licenses, security clearances appear to be required in a 
range of situations. It is unclear whether an individual’s nationality or other 
non-objective factors within the meaning of GATS Article V might be used 
to determine the granting of a clearance. It may well be more onerous for a 
non-Canadian service supplier to obtain a clearance from Canada’s security 
agencies given the need for cooperation between security services in other 
jurisdictions. 
F. Intellectual Property and the Canadian Cannabis Scheme
A significant part of the “value” of cannabis as a product may be traded 
without the drug itself crossing international borders through services that 
transmit know-how about growing, cultivation, production, testing, quality 
control, and so forth. Typically, such know-how is proprietary and is traded 
through licenses and contracts that require protection of trade secrets and 
give limited rights to use the intellectual property, for example, patents, of 
the provider. WTO law requires the recognition and enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights acquired in any WTO Member by every other Member, 
subject to certain limitations and exceptions.247
While there is some uncertainty regarding whether new strains, or adap-
tations of strains of cannabis, are appropriately protected by patents,248 or 
university or a Canadian professional association.” Cannabis Regulations, supra note 10, § 
23(2). 
246. GATS, supra note 228, art. VI:4.
247. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. “Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as 
specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any 
act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expe-
ditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of 
barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.” Id. art. 41; see 
also CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007); GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE 
C. DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (2012).
248. See Stephanie Curcio, Protecting Cannabis Strains in Canada: A Growing Con-
cern, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=62f25af5-
a4f7-47a1-93b0-5b60973acf56 (“Canada has excluded plants and other ‘higher life forms’ 
from patent eligibility. This differs from the United States, which allows utility patents to be 
obtained in respect of higher life forms, including various strains of cannabis. Despite canna-
bis being illegal in most of the United States, there is no prohibition on obtaining a patent for 
a cannabis plant or a related product, method or process. In fact, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) has already issued a patent for a hybrid cannabis plant having 
certain characteristics that are patently distinguishable from known strains.”). 
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alternatively plant breeder’s rights,249 entities of other WTO Members so far 
seem to have little difficulty with patent applications in Canada,250 although, 
as is often noted, these patents have yet to be tested in litigation.251 Notably, 
the UN drug conventions do not provide that obtaining intellectual property 
rights with respect to scheduled drugs should be prohibited or restricted, and 
this is consistent with the acceptance of some medical uses of scheduled 
drugs, albeit tightly controlled ones.252
In the case of trademarks, there is a distinct possibility of conflict aris-
ing between Canada’s scheme and the WTO rules on intellectual property 
rights. The Cannabis Act prohibits packaging or labeling of cannabis that, 
inter alia, “sets out a depiction of a person, character or animal, whether real 
or fictional” or “associates the cannabis or one of its brand elements with, or 
evokes a positive or negative emotion about or image of, a way of life such 
as one that includes glamour, recreation, excitement, vitality, risk or dar-
ing . . . .”253 Article 20 of the WTO TRIPS Agreement provides that “[t]he 
use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably encum-
bered by special requirements.”254 In the Australia–Plain Packaging case, 
the panel held that the application of Article 20 should be informed by an 
assessment of three factors:
249. The TRIPS Agreement is permissive of whether WTO Members protect intellectual 
property in the production of plants through patents or a sui generis system such as plant 
breeder’s rights. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 247, art. 27, ¶ 3(b)); see also Keenan Fast, 
The Highs and Lows of Patenting Marijuana Strains, IP Osgoode (Aug. 10, 2018), 
http://code-2.osgoode.yorku.ca/2018/08/the-highs-and-lows-of-patenting-marijuana-
strains/#more-32032 (discussing Canada’s current lack of patent protection for novel plant 
breeds, stemming from a pair of Canadian Supreme Court cases).
“In the landmark 2002 Supreme Court patent case of Harvard College v Canada (Com-
missioner of Patents), it was decided that ‘higher lifeforms’, which include plants, could never 
be subject to a patent protection per the Patent Act. This ruling was complicated two years 
later in Monsanto Canada Inc. v Schmeiser. Schmeiser’s ruling decided that, while it was true 
that a plant itself could not be patented, a man-made gene within a plant could be. If a plant 
contains such a modified gene then, for all practical intents and purposes, the plant itself could 
be patented because ‘where a defendant’s commercial or business activity involves a thing of 
which a patented part is a significant or important component, infringement is established.’ ”
Id. (quoting Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 931–32 (Can.)).
250. See Kimberly A. McManus & Erica L. Lowthers, Legalization of Recreational Ma-
rijuana: The Cannabis Industry’s Race to the Patent Office, AIRD BERLIS (June 21, 2017), 
https://www.airdberlis.com/insights/publications/publication/legalization-of-recreational-
marijuana-the-cannabis-industrys-race-to-the-patent-office. 
251. See John Simpson, The Green Rush to Register Cannabis Trademarks, CANADIAN 
LAW. (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/author/john-simpson/the-green-
rush-to-register-cannabis-trademarks-15652/ (noting that there were more than 500 trademark 
applications pending as of April 2018 relating to “proposed use” claims for cannabis or can-
nabis-related goods or services that had yet to be examined). 
252. See Naomi Burke-Shyne et al., How Drug Control Policy and Practice Undermine 
Access to Controlled Medicines, 19 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 237, 238 (2017). 
253. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, § 26(c)–(d) (Can.).
254. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 247, art. 20.
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a. the nature and extent of the encumbrance, bearing in mind the 
legitimate interest of the trademark holder . . .;
b. the reasons for which the special requirements are applied, in-
cluding any societal interests they are intended to safeguard; 
and
c. whether these reasons provide sufficient support for the result-
ing encumbrance.255
As with the case of tobacco plain packaging, Canada’s goal of ensuring 
that consumption of cannabis is not made attractive to young people would 
likely be accepted as an important “societal interest.” However, the vague-
ness (and arguably obscurity) of the notion “evokes a positive or negative 
emotion about or image of a way of life” as stated in the Cannabis Act is 
likely to raise two issues of TRIPS compliance under the approach of the 
Australia–Plain Packaging panel. First, because of the expansiveness of this 
language, it could conceivably be applied to any trademark or presentation 
of it that evokes any positive association with the brand of cannabis to 
which the mark is connected. This could include, for instance, a calm or 
balanced way of life. This goes to the extent of the encumbrance—its sever-
ity (factor (a)).
The second concern is that of “sufficient support” by reasons of the ex-
tent of the encumbrance (factor (c)). Article 26(a) of the Cannabis Act pro-
hibits packaging or labeling if “there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the package or label could be appealing to young persons.”256 This is per-
haps a sufficient encumbrance to protect Canada’s societal interest, thus 
putting into question the need for the broad and vague language about nega-
tive or positive emotions concerning lifestyles. Instead of this kind of provi-
sion, Canada could have chosen to stipulate encumbrances on the use of 
trademarks in packaging and labeling in terms of the harmful impact to be 
avoided; for example, prohibiting packaging or labeling, or words or sym-
bols in packaging and labeling, likely to encourage irresponsible or exces-
sive use of cannabis. Moreover, the additional encumbrance, prohibiting 
packaging or labeling that “sets outs a depiction of a person, character or 
animal, whether real or fictional” seems to have nothing directly to do with 
Canada’s societal interests. It may be discrimination against the only signif-
icant existing global cannabis brand associated with a person, Marley Natu-
ral brand, which also has a lion in the logo for the brand.257 Such discrimina-
255. Australia–Plain Packaging, supra note 9, ¶ 7.2430.
256. Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c 16, §26(a).
257. Marley Natural is the official cannabis brand of Bob Marley, developed by his es-
tate in conjunction with the private equity firm Privateer Holdings, which develops cannabis 
industry brands. See MARLEY NATURAL, https://www.marleynatural.com (last visited Mar. 
12, 2019).
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tion against a brand established in another WTO Member would reasonably 
be viewed as incompatible with a justified encumbrance on the use of 
trademarks.
Conclusion
Canada was not the first country to legalize recreational cannabis, and it 
will likely not be the last.258 With the trend toward legalization of recrea-
tional cannabis likely to continue, the international legal issues encountered 
will persist unless they are addressed at a global level through coordinated 
international efforts. While the international drug conventions interact in 
some ways with the international human rights regime, particularly as coun-
tries reevaluate the negative effects of drug criminalization on vulnerable 
communities within their borders, the international economic law regime 
remains separate. Yet, as recreational cannabis is legalized in more jurisdic-
tions, questions of goods, services, and intellectual property pertaining to 
trade will grow in prominence.
The elephant in the room of cannabis legalization is the drug control 
and anti-trafficking regime, but, as we have demonstrated, there may be 
ways around the supposedly unequivocal rules laid down by the conven-
tions. Canada is leading the charge and navigating uncharted waters in bal-
ancing its obligations under human rights treaties, the drug conventions, and 
WTO agreements. Perhaps Canada will withdraw from the drug conventions 
and rejoin them with reservations; perhaps the WHO will convince the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs to reschedule cannabis, thus eliminating the 
INCB’s concerns regarding Canada’s cannabis legalization regime; perhaps 
the drug conventions will simply be ignored when it comes to cannabis.
How Canada’s recreational cannabis legalization progresses will shape 
the way other countries approach the question. Of enormous significance 
will be how Canada addresses the needs of its minority communities who 
have been most adversely affected by the criminalization of cannabis. With-
out allowing for the expungement of prior non-violent cannabis-related 
criminal convictions, Canada will be paving the way for the extremely lu-
crative cannabis market to be held captive by cannabis entrepreneurs who 
approach legalized cannabis in the same way that they approach tech inno-
vations. At the same time, multinational tobacco, alcohol, and pharmaceuti-
cal companies are looking to diversify into cannabis and are already maneu-
vering to take advantage of Canada’s legalization. Cannabis is a multi-
billion dollar industry, and understanding where international law interacts 
258. While the United States continues its War on Drugs, for instance, ten states and 
Washington, D.C., have legalized recreational cannabis, with many more legalizing medical 
cannabis. This is somewhat ironic, given that the harsh scheduling of cannabis and the general 
strictness of the criminalization obligations in the drug conventions stemmed from American 
hysteria, since by allowing individual states to bypass the obligations in the drug conventions, 
the United States currently only partially complies with the obligations.
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with domestic regulations will be key to ensuring that the wrong interests do 
not capture global cannabis, whether they be illicit drug traffickers or ex-
ploitative multinational corporations.
